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OLD SCHOOL GOES ONLINE:
EXPLORING FIDUCIARY OBLIGATIONS OF LOYALTY
AND CARE IN THE DIGITAL PLATFORMS ERA
By Richard S. Whitt1
“Study the past if you would define the future.”
-Confucius

As the World Wide Web has become a pervasive feature of life for
billions of people, concerns are growing that new legal mechanisms
are necessary to govern the activities of online service providers
(OSPs). In particular, today’s Web ecosystems are presided over by
multisided online platforms, extracting and analyzing personal data in
the absence of express obligations to protect and promote their users’
interests. Not surprisingly, over the past twenty years scholars have
begun reaching back to “old school” common law doctrines for
guidance. One promising legal field entails fiduciary duty-based
relationships, which have a robust, globe-spanning history stretching
hundreds of years. The latest such approach is the information
fiduciaries (IF) model, introduced by academics Jack Balkin and
Jonathan Zittrain.
The IF model posits that OSPs should be required to abide by
fiduciary duties of care, loyalty, and confidentiality with regard to their
end users. A recent draft paper by Lina Khan and David Pozen,
however, sees an unsolvable incongruity between a mandated duty of
loyalty, and both the corporate law of Delaware, and the financial
imperatives of online advertising-based companies such as Facebook.
As it turns out, while the IF model’s creators invoke the fiduciary duty

1
Currently fellow in residence with the Mozilla Foundation, senior fellow with the Georgetown
Tech Law and Policy Institute, and president of GLIA Foundation. My thanks to Mike Godwin,
distinguished senior fellow at R Street Institute, for his thoughtful critique of an earlier paper
draft, and his persuasive take on the relative importance of the fiduciary duty of confidentiality.
My appreciation as well to Dr. Todd Kelsey, who supplied his usual trenchant analysis in his
role as AI advisor to GLIA Foundation. Finally, Alex Givens and her students in the
Georgetown University Law Center’s Spring 2019 Tech Law Scholars Seminar provided their
own useful suggestions regarding an initial version of this piece.
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of loyalty, in reality their model relies on mandated obligations rooted
only in care and confidentiality.
Fortunately, the IF model does not exhaust the richness and depth
of fiduciary law doctrine. Another proposed approach is the “digital
trustmediary” (DTM), a cornerstone feature of the GLIAnet project2).
The DTM model involves entities providing advanced digital service to
their clients, while voluntarily operating under heightened fiduciary
duties of loyalty, care, and confidentiality. The opt-in DTM model is
positioned as a well-considered alternative to a current Web ecosystem
generally lacking in bona fide fiduciary-like relationships. The IF
model of mandated care, and the DTM model of voluntary loyalty,
present two different but complementary approaches to injecting
greater trust and accountability in the Web.
Finally, other tenets of the common law remain available for
exploration. Indeed, what could be termed “digital common law”
holds the potential to contribute usefully to modern day conversations
about the role of digital technologies in society.

2

To access the GLIAnet project, see GLIANET, www.glia.net (last visited Oct. 1, 2019).
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INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY
The concept of information fiduciaries has received considerable
attention in recent years as one way to impose greater societal
obligations on Web-based entities. This paper probes the information
fiduciaries concept as a useful entrée into a broader discussion of how
to bring longstanding legal institutions into the online digital world.
This Article has five primary objectives. First, it will describe the
information fiduciary (IF) model, as laid out by scholars Jack Balkin
and Jonathan Zittrain, which was criticized recently by Lina Khan and
David Pozen. Second, it will undertake a deeper dive into the basics of
the common law of fiduciary obligations, including the twin duties of
care and of loyalty. Third, the paper will examine the information
fiduciaries model from the standpoint of traditional common law and
modern-day commentary.
Fourth, the paper will explore a proposed alternative legal model,
the “digital trustmediary” (or DTM), with entrusted entities voluntarily
acting under a heightened fiduciary duty of loyalty, and an enabling
duty of confidentiality, to their clients. This DTM model will be posited
as a viable response to the current Web ecosystem, which is presided
over by online platforms extracting and analyzing end user data in the
absence of express fiduciary obligations.
The paper concludes by suggesting ways to meld together the two
different but complementary IF and DTM fiduciary approaches in the
context of Web-based entities. Consistent with this Author’s prior
written work on functional openness, 3 the overarching intention is to
breathe productive new life into old school legal doctrines. In this case,
a brief trip down well-worn paths from the past should prove
instructive.
I.

THE INFORMATION FIDUCIARIES MODEL AND ITS CRITICS
A. Background

Since the dawn of the Web, people have sought to link traditional
notions of intermediaries and fiduciary obligations to the digital world.
Such proposals have centered on the roles of managing and protecting
user data and information.
In 1996, for example, Kenneth Laudon described a scenario where
agents that he called “information fiduciaries” would manage

3

Richard Whitt, Hiding in the Open: How Tech Network Policies Can Inform Openness by
Design (and Vice Versa), 3 GEO. L. TECH. REV. 28, 66-74 (2018).
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information deposited by end users.4 Three years later, in Net Worth,
John Hagel and Marc Singer introduced the term “infomediary” to
describe a customer agent that extracts monetary value from the
customer’s information.5 In 2008, on the more defensive front, Neil
Richards explained the necessity of subjecting search engines, online
bookstores, and other “information fiduciaries” to regulation, including
“meaningful requirements of confidentiality.”6
In brief, these early camps were divided. Some like Laudon touted
the possibility of affirmative, marketplace-based duties between
willing parties, while Richards and others proposed government
mandates to safeguard user privacy interests.
Beginning in 2015, scholars Jack Balkin and Jonathan Zittrain
have developed the concept of an “information fiduciary” (IF)7 which
would be applied to a category of online service providers (OSPs).
Balkin and Zittrain have stated that the IF concept would impose legal
duties akin to those found in the traditional common law doctrine of
fiduciary obligations.8
By mid-2019, support in the United States for regulating OSPs as
information fiduciaries had grown appreciably. Other scholars and
commentators began expressing their backing to the IF model.9
Federal legislation containing OSP fiduciary obligations was

4

Kenneth C. Laudon, Markets and Privacy, 39 COMM. OF THE ACM 92, 101 (Sept. 1996).
JOHN HAGEL III & MARC SINGER, NET WORTH: SHAPING MARKETS WHEN CUSTOMERS
MAKE THE RULES 40-42 (1999).
6
Neil M. Richards, Intellectual Privacy, 87 TEX. L. REV. 387, 436 (Dec. 2008); see also NEIL
RICHARDS, INTELLECTUAL PRIVACY: RETHINKING CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE DIGITAL AGE 168
(2015) (describing information fiduciaries dealing in intellectual data); see also DANIEL J.
SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON: TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE (2006)
(suggesting how exploring fiduciary law is a way to deal with data brokers); see also Ian Kerr,
The Legal Relationship Between Online Service Providers and Users, 35 CAN. BUS. L.J. 419
(2001) (concluding that some Internet Service Provider (ISP)-end user interactions display the
constitutive elements of a fiduciary relationship).
7
The Balkin/Zittrain information fiduciary model will be termed as “IF” throughout this paper
to delineate it from earlier instantiations of the more general concept.
8
See infra.
9
See, e.g., ARI EZRA WALDMAN, PRIVACY AS TRUST: INFORMATION PRIVACY FOR AN
INFORMATION AGE 85-88 (2018) (articulating support for the IFs model as an alternative to a
“notice-and-choice” regime); MIKE GODWIN, THE SPLINTERS OF OUR DISCONTENT: HOW TO FIX
SOCIAL MEDIA AND DEMOCRACY WITHOUT BREAKING THEM 29-38 (May 14, 2019)
(expressing support for Facebook and other OSPs to adduce to fiduciary law-based standards
like information fiduciaries); ROGER MCNAMEE, ZUCKED 247, 260 (Feb. 5, 2019) (like doctors
and lawyers, companies should act as fiduciaries to protect the interests of consumers); Neil
Richards & Woodrow Hartzog, Taking Trust Seriously in Privacy Law, 19 STAN. TECH. L. REV.
431, 457-58 (2016) (supporting the IFs concept as a way to protect user privacy).
5
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endorsed,10 and subsequently introduced.11 Launch of a Harvard
University-based “Information Fiduciary Consortium” was
announced.12 A recent Federal Communications Commission (FCC)
Chairman weighed in favorably on applying common law obligations
to online entities.13 Even Mark Zuckerberg gave a “thumbs up” to
Facebook being treated as a fiduciary.14
In late February 2019, however, scholars Lina Khan and David
Pozen published an initial draft law journal article entitled A Skeptical
View of Information Fiduciaries.15 As the name suggests, the authors
leveled substantial criticism on the IF concept as a poor legal and
practical fit to platform companies like Facebook.
B. The “Information Fiduciaries” Proposal
In an April 2016 law journal article, Information Fiduciaries and
the First Amendment,16 Balkin first laid out the case for IFs in some
detail. He explained that OSPs are in a special position to collect,
analyze, use, sell, and distribute their end users’ personal information.
In his view, those entities – which include search engines, social
networks, Internet Service Providers (ISPs), email providers, and cloud
companies – should be induced to take on fiduciary responsibilities.17
Balkin stressed that “there is no single class of fiduciary duties
that applies equally in all situations.”18 Noting the two basic common
10

See, e.g., Adam Schwartz & Cindy Cohn, “Information Fiduciaries” Must Protect your Data
Privacy, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION (Oct. 25, 2018),
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2018/10/information-fiduciaries-must-protect-your-data-privacy.
11
In mid-December 2018, U.S. Senator Brian Schatz (D-HI) and fourteen co-signors released
Senate Bill 3744, the “Data Care Act of 2018,” which includes express duties of care, loyalty,
and confidentiality applied to OSPs regarding their uses of personal data. See Data Care Act of
2018, S. 3744, 115th Cong. (2018); see also Schwartz & Cohn, supra note 10.
12
See Berkman Klein Center, Where’s My Data? Data Transparency,
https://berkmancenter.github.io/datatransparency (last visited Sept. 21, 2019). The website
currently includes a link to an undated document asking companies to join the “Information
Fiduciary Consortium,” but no further information appears to be available online.
13
Tom Wheeler, The Root of the Matter: Data and Duty, HARVARD KENNEDY SCHOOL,
SHORENSTEIN CENTER ON MEDIA, POLITICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY, Nov. 2018, at 10-11 (rules
for the new digital economy should include the common law concept of a duty of care).
14
Josh Constine, Highlights & transcript from Zuckerberg’s 20K-word ethics talk,
TECHCRUNCH (Feb. 20, 2019, 3:05 PM), https://techcrunch.com/2019/02/20/zuckerbergharvard-zittrain/zuck interview [hereinafter Zuckerberg Harvard Interview Transcript].
15
A subsequent version of the article was posted on May 25, 2019 and provides the basis for
this analysis. Lina M. Khan & David E. Pozen, A Skeptical View of Information Fiduciaries,
133 HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 1) (on file with SSRN).
16
See Jack M. Balkin, Information Fiduciaries and the First Amendment, 49 U.C. Davis L. Rev.
1183 (Apr. 2016) [hereinafter Information Fiduciaries].
17
Id. at 1186.
18
Id. at 1225.
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law fiduciary duties of care and of loyalty, Balkin explains that his
concept is that OSPs should “act in ways that do not harm the interests
of” their end users.19 OSPs should not betray confidence that they
induce, and otherwise “act like con men.”20 By contrast, the traditional
duties of loyalty applied to doctors and lawyers “are often quite broad
and strong,” and “people do not expect the same degree of concern
from online service providers.”21 Because the information practices of
fiduciaries differ from those involving ordinary strangers, reasonable
obligations placed on information fiduciaries would not violate the
First Amendment.22
In a subsequent paper, Balkin again emphasized that digital
information fiduciaries “should have fewer obligations than traditional
professional fiduciaries like doctor, lawyers, and accountants.”23 He
reasoned that users do not expect comprehensive obligations of care
from “special-purpose information fiduciaries” like their ISPs, search
engines, and social media.24 He repeated that these entities’ “central
obligation is that they cannot act like con artists.”25
In late 2016, Zittrain joined Balkin in penning an article calling
for a “grand bargain organized around the idea of fiduciary
responsibility.”26 Online companies would agree to take on the
obligations of IFs – which the authors explained were primarily not to
unfairly discriminate against, or abuse the trust of, their end users. In
exchange, Congress could offer special immunities and safe harbors
from uncertain legal liabilities. If done correctly, they argued, this
trade-off would institute “the duty to use personal data in ways that
don’t betray end users and harm them.”27
In a New York Times editorial published in April 2018, Zittrain
explained IFs in the realm of data sharing scandals at Facebook.28
19

Id. at 1186.
Id. at 1224.
21
Id. at 1225-26.
22
See Information Fiduciaries, supra note 16, at 1209-1225.
23
Jack M. Balkin, Free Speech in the Algorithmic Society: Big Data, Private Governance, and
New School Speech Regulation, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1149, 1163 (2018) (hereinafter Free
Speech in the Algorithmic Society).
24
Id. at 1162-63.
25
Id. at 1163.
26
Jack M. Balkin & Jonathan Zittrain, A Grand Bargain to Make Tech Companies Trustworthy,
THE ATLANTIC (Oct. 3, 2016),
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2016/10/information-fiduciary/502346/.
27
Id.
28
Jonathan Zittrain, Mark Zuckerberg Can Still Fix This Mess, THE NEW YORK TIMES (Apr. 7,
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/07/opinion/sunday/zuckerberg-facebook-privacycongress.html.
20
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Zittrain saw one answer in Facebook accepting societal obligations as
an IF, which would demand Facebook to “not betray our interests.”29
As Zittrain explains it:
Mr. Zuckerberg has the power to shake things up. He could
bind his company to practices and technologies aimed at a sea
change on user privacy and autonomy. Rather than circling
the wagons, Facebook can join the cause. If it doesn’t, people
should disperse to platforms that will.30
Balkin’s most recent works invoke the IF model in the context of
market challenges with social media.31 In these papers he more
explicitly claims that the fiduciary duty of loyalty would apply to IFs.32
He argues that this new obligation would “make social media
companies internalize the costs they impose on society through
surveillance, addiction, and manipulation by giving them new social
responsibilities.”33 What this duty of loyalty means in practice, he
emphasizes, depends on the nature of the business, and the reasonable
expectations of its users.34 Even so, he repeats the notion from his
previous papers that the obligations for these entities would remain
more limited than for other types of information fiduciaries. As he puts
it succinctly:
Facebook is not your doctor. YouTube is not your accountant
or estate manager. We should be careful to tailor the fiduciary
obligations to the nature of the business and to the reasonable
expectations of consumers. That means that social media

29

Id.
Id. Zuckerberg’s March 6, 2019 announcement of a major shift in Facebook’s business
model, from the “town square” of social media to the “living room” of private communications,
is a fascinating pivot point. See Mark Zuckerberg, A Privacy-Focused Vision for Networking,
FACEBOOK (Mar. 6, 2019), https://www.facebook.com/notes/mark-zuckerberg/a-privacyfocused-vision-for-social-networking/10156700570096634/. Putting aside skepticism about
motivations and follow-through, the new model arguably would comport better to a certain
scope of fiduciary obligation than the company’s existing social media platform.
31
See Jack M. Balkin, Free Speech is a Triangle, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 2011 (2018) [hereinafter
Free Speech is a Triangle]; see also Jack M. Balkin, The First Amendment in the Second Gilded
Age, 66 BUFF. L. REV. 979 (Dec. 1, 2018) [hereinafter Second Gilded Age]; see also Jack M.
Balkin, The Three Laws of Robotics in the Age of Big Data, 78 OHIO ST. L.J. 1217 (2017)
[hereinafter Three Laws of Robotics]; see also JACK M. BALKIN, FIXING SOCIAL MEDIA’S
GRAND BARGAIN (Oct. 15, 2018),
https://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/research/docs/balkin_webreadypdf.pdf [hereinafter
Fixing Social Media’s Grand Bargain].
32
Fixing Social’s Media’s Grand Bargain, supra note 31, at 12-13; Free Speech Is a Triangle,
supra note 31, at 2048; Second Gilded Age, supra note 31, at 1009; Three Laws of Robotics,
supra note 31, at 1229.
33
Fixing Social Media’s Grand Bargain, supra note 31, at 11.
34
Second Gilded Age, supra note 31, at 1009.
30
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companies’ fiduciary duties will be more limited.35
In his later works, Balkin notes again that, “[a]t base, the [duty] of
loyalty mean[s] that digital fiduciaries many not act like con artists” by
“creat[ing] an unreasonable risk of harm to their end users.”36
C. The Khan/Pozen Response
As indicated above, the Balkin/Zittrain proposal on IFs has
engendered a range of positive responses. Nonetheless, the
Khan/Pozen draft paper released online in May 2019 makes no bones
about its intention to “disrupt the emerging consensus” of support.37 In
fact, Khan and Pozen see the proposed IF model as “moving the
conversation backward” on how to regulate digital firms such as
Facebook.38
The paper’s initial critique focuses on how the officers and
directors of a Delaware corporation already owe a core duty of loyalty
to stockholders. The authors claim that this obligation is deeply
inconsistent with any similar duty imposed on behalf of end users.
Khan and Pozen argue that Facebook would be unable to manage the
divided loyalties of its stockholders versus its users, especially since
the company ostensibly would own a higher duty of loyalty to its
stockholders.39 In other words, “the business model matters.”40
The authors also point out that noted legal experts have argued for
two different interpretations of the duty of loyalty. The thinner,
“prescriptive” account requires that the fiduciary avoid conflicts
between self-interest and fulfilment of its duty to the beneficiary.41 The
thicker, “prospective” account requires an affirmative devotion
towards the beneficiary.42 Khan and Pozen submit that Facebook could
pass neither test with regard to its business model and users, and so this
fundamental misalignment renders the duty of loyalty implausible.43

35

Fixing Social Media’s Grand Bargain, supra note 31, at 12.
Id. at 13, 14.
37
Khan & Pozen, supra note 15 (manuscript at 2).
38
Id. (manuscript at 39). The information fiduciaries framework “invites an enervating
complacency about issues of structural power and a premature abandonment of more robust
visions of public regulation.” Id. (manuscript at 5).
39
Id. (manuscript at 5-10).
40
Id. (manuscript at 17).
41
Id. (manuscript at 15).
42
Id. (manuscript at 15-16).
43
Khan & Pozen, supra note 15 (manuscript at 17). The authors point out that Facebook’s
business model does not just affect its end users. Advertisers, content producers, nonusers, and
other “dependent parties” are affected as well – and yet they are not included within the
protections of the fiduciary obligation. Id. (manuscript at 17).
36
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The paper notes that a power-based argument for the duty of
loyalty depends on two prongs: (1) “the fiduciary possesses
professional skills and competencies that the beneficiary lacks”, and
(2) using those services requires the disclosure of personal information
that the fiduciary could exploit.44 Khan and Pozen find that neither
prong applies to Facebook: they have no special expertise to run a
social media platform, and the users’ exposure is simply “the price that
online providers have chosen to set.”45
Khan and Pozen also find what they call second-order information
asymmetries (where the beneficiary understands the core elements of
the relationship, but not the technical details), as well as first-order
information asymmetries (where the beneficiary lacks even this core
shared understanding).46 This “elaborate system of social control”
cannot be squared with any meaningful fiduciary duty.47
Finally, the authors concede that the information fiduciaries
model appears superficially attractive from a theoretical, political, and
aesthetic perspective.48 Nonetheless, as a government-imposed
limitation on protected speech, the IF model still would violate the First
Amendment, and leave many problems unaddressed, including the
need for pro-competition reforms.49 As they conclude, “[w]e can
regulate the dominant online platforms as information fiduciaries or we
can target their market dominance and business models, but very likely
we will not do both.”50
II.

GETTING GROUNDED IN THE COMMON LAW OF FIDUCIARIES

Recent public policy conversations about regulating OSPs –
including the IF model proposal – hinge on adopting and applying the
relevant substance of fiduciary obligations. It is surprising, then, that
the supporting documents do not dig more deeply into the richness of
common law doctrine. This Part will do just that, albeit in an
abbreviated way. The premise is that the explanatory roots of fiduciary
accountability can provide considerable guidance, as we sort through
whether and how such old school duties should apply to the burgeoning
new world of Web-based entities and activities.

44

Id. (manuscript at 18).
Id. (manuscript at 18-19).
46
Id. (manuscript at 20-21).
47
Id. (manuscript at 21).
48
Khan & Pozen, supra note 15 (manuscript at 29-30).
49
Id. (manuscript at 30-37).
50
Id. (manuscript at 36).
45
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A. Complex and Contextual Roots
The law of fiduciary relationships is a complex one, entwined with
centuries of equity, torts, and other common law doctrine. Fiduciary
law principles have been applied across a vast array of human
endeavors,51 and most major global cultures.52 More recently, elements
of this private law regime have been extended by scholars to the public
law realm, as articulated in the “fiduciary theory of government” for
both citizens’ relationships to their own governments,53 and to human
rights vis-à-vis international institutions.54 Some scholars even believe
the U.S. Constitution itself should be viewed as a fiduciary instrument,
premised on power of attorney-like obligations of care, loyalty, and
impartiality.55
Recently, there has been a renaissance of sorts in the study and
application of fiduciary doctrine. As leading fiduciaries law scholar
Tamar Frankel has aptly noted, “throughout the centuries the problems
that these laws were designed to solve are eternal, etched in human
nature, derived from human needs, and built into human activities.”56
Over time, fiduciary duty has become a legal category unto itself,
embracing a range of different types of entities and relationships.57 At
its core, however, the law of fiduciaries provides for the assignment of
certain moral and legal obligations to people and entities engaged in
exchanges of value with each other.
Despite (or perhaps due to) the lengthy history of fiduciaries in
common law, some find that “[t]here is considerable uncertainty over
the basis, nature, and scope of fiduciary duties as well as their

51

THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF FIDUCIARY LAW (Evan J. Criddle, Paul B. Miller, & Robert H.
Sitkoff eds., 2019). Entire book chapters separately cover agency, trust law, corporate law,
nonprofits law, banking, pension law, employment law, bankruptcy, family law, legal
representation, health care, public affairs, and international law. Id. at 23-363.
52
Legal systems discussed at length include English common law, canon law, Roman law,
classical Islamic law, classical Jewish law, European civil systems, Chinese law, Indian law,
and Japanese law. Id. at 471-663.
53
See FIDUCIARY GOVERNMENT (Evan J. Criddle, Evan Fox-Decent, Andrew S. Gold, Sung
Hui Kim, & Paul B. Miller eds., 2018).
54
See FIDUCIARIES OF HUMANITY (Evan J. Criddle & Evan Fox-Decent eds., 2016).
55
See GARY LAWSON & GUY SEIDMAN, A GREAT POWER OF ATTORNEY: UNDERSTANDING THE
FIDUCIARY CONSTITUTION (2017).
56
TAMAR FRANKEL, FIDUCIARY LAW 79 (Dec. 17, 2010).
57
Classically, economists see fiduciary law as a response to a principal-agent problem, where
one party undertakes imperfectly observable discretionary actions that affect the interests of the
principal. Andrew Gold & Paul Miller, Introduction, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS 8
(Andrew Gold & Paul Miller eds., 2014). Frankel’s view, and that of many other scholars, is
that this contracts law-derived perspective unnecessarily narrows the conception of a robust
fiduciary relationship.
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justification.”58 In part, “fiduciary obligation eludes theoretical capture
because it arises in diverse types of relationships.”59 As a result, the
doctrine is uniquely bound to the relevant context.60
B. A Basis in Entrusted Power
The crucial linchpin of every fiduciary obligation is what Frankel
calls “entrusted power,” affecting the existence, nature, and rules of
such relationships.61 The core concept is that an individual or entity
(the “entrustor”) grants access to property, or some other thing of value,
to specified fiduciaries, for the purpose of having them undertake tasks
that benefit the entrustor.62 Or as scholar Paul Miller puts it, a fiduciary
relationship is one in which one party exercises discretionary power
over the significant practical interests of another.63 In fiduciary
relationships, “entrustors are always the vulnerable party.”64
To Frankel, “all definitions [of fiduciaries] share three main
elements: (1) [the] entrustment of property or power; (2) [the]
entrustors’ trust of fiduciaries, and (3) [the] risk to entrustors emanating
from the entrustment.”65 In particular, fiduciaries offer expert, and
usually socially desirable, services, and are granted the property or
power to carry out their duties. So, fiduciary relationships often carry
a unique blend of the extent of entrustment, degrees of trust, and levels
of risk. Likelihood of a failed relationship can come from entrustors
failing to protect themselves, markets failing to protect entrustors, or
where the costs for fiduciaries to establish their trustworthiness exceeds
their benefits from the relationship.66
C. Deepening the Queries: Why, What, Who, and How
At this juncture it would be useful to break out fiduciary doctrine
into its basic components. These include understanding why there are
such duties in the first place, what are the interests at stake, who are the
58
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See id. at 9.
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Frankel, supra note 56, at 26.
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players involved, and how are the substantive standards defined and
applied.
1. The Why: Trust versus Power
The simplest question is, why does fiduciary law exist in the first
place? Frankel’s response is straightforward: the duty of loyalty is
rooted in asymmetric power relationships between two parties.67 Once
a relationship has been established, fiduciaries enjoy power over
beneficiaries.68 Others concur.69 Miller observes that power may mean
a number of things in different contexts, including “control, authority,
strength, or influence,” among others.70
Not surprisingly, entrusted power rises with the number of
entrustors, and the amount of entrusted assets.71 In turn, the formation
of an actual fiduciary relationship involves three related structural
properties between the fiduciary and the beneficiary/entrustor:
inequality, dependence, and vulnerability.72 One basis of the
fiduciary’s power over the entrustor is the disparity of knowledge,
expertise, and experience between the two parties.73 Nonetheless, the
source of entrusted power, and conflicting interests, often can be
hidden from the beneficiaries.74 As a result, the issue of trust emerges
over and over again as the pivotal consideration.75
For the most part, common law recognizes services that require
certain levels of expertise or experience in the fiduciary, that otherwise
are lacking in the beneficiary. Prime examples include the medical
profession, the legal profession, and certain financial sectors.
Entrustment of power or property to those providing these kinds of
services triggers the obligation.
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2. The What: Personal and Practical Interests
The entrustment of power means shifting decisional control over
something. What is that something? Traditionally, the gravamen of the
relationship has been a type of tangible asset, such as a financial
instrument or real property. In some legal trusts, however, the
healthcare of the entrustor is at issue; in others, the legal status.
Because fiduciary power is relational, the “what” is limited only
by what is deemed important to the entrustor. As a result, often the
relationship deals with, and profoundly affects, people’s practical
interests, even to more intangible matters of personality, welfare, or
rights.76 D. Gordon Smith posits for example that the gravamen of
fiduciary duties is a “critical resource,” which includes tangible
property, but of which the most important category is confidential
information.77
So, the “what” of fiduciary power extends to information derived
from the underlying relationship. Brooks points out that “relational
knowledge” – special information that fiduciaries acquire about their
beneficiaries – is key to the economic logic and the law supporting
these relationships.78 These entities “[o]ftentimes [have] even more
knowledge, in some respects, than beneficiaries possess about
themselves,” which includes “knowing their beneficiaries’ personal
and otherwise private information . . . .79 But the reach is broader than
that. As Brooks goes on to explain:
In addition to knowing their beneficiaries’ personal and
otherwise private information, fiduciaries normally have or
should have superior knowledge concerning the external
circumstances to which this information may be put to use in
the context of their relationship as well as beyond.80
So, entrusted power relationships encompass many forms of
tangible and intangible “stuff,” often of a deeply personal nature,
subject to a defined range of discretionary decisions and actions.
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3. The Who: Status and Consent
Another gating question is to whom fiduciary obligations should
be applied in the first place. Generally speaking, fiduciary duties either
can be imposed (based on an entity’s status, its specific role vis-à-vis
its customers) or assumed (based on the entity’s consent to take on the
enunciated duties.81
The “status” finding often is based on the answer to the What
question: an entity’s access to sensitive information about a person,
such as health, wealth, and criminal or civil culpability. Such access
entails a necessary degree of trust between the parties. So, attorneys
and their clients, physicians and their patients, guardians and their
wards, clergy and their parishioners, and (some) financial agents and
their clients – all can be considered in more “formal” fiduciary
relationships.82
By contrast, “consent” status relates to an entity’s voluntary
undertaking or “holding itself out” to, a specified fiduciary standard.
These duties can be laid out in places like professional codes of conduct
or industry principles. Scholars, such as Edelman, suggest that all
meaningful forms of fiduciary relationships arise in consensual
settings, where fiduciaries have voluntarily undertaken their
obligations.83 On the other hand, courts tend “to impose fiduciary
duties where one party has a continuing authority or power over
another, which is” difficult “to monitor and control, and which exposes
the entrusting party to” domination, undue influence, or a special
vulnerability.84
According to one scholar, there are three principal modes of
authorizing or requiring a fiduciary relationship: mutual consent of the
parties, unilateral undertaking by one party, and legal decree.85 The
latter can be derived by court decisions, legislative acts, or regulations.
4. The How: Care and Loyalty – and Other
Obligations
At the core of fiduciary obligation “lies a suite of duties designed
to nullify any temptation to sacrifice the interests of the beneficiary.”86
81
Joshua Getzler, Ascribing and Limiting Fiduciary Obligations, in in PHILOSOPHICAL
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Precisely how potential fiduciary obligations are carried out typically
boil down to two separate sets of duties,87 both with roots in ancient
concepts:
• Duty of care: The fiduciary satisfies this standard by
executing its services with prudence, attention, and
proficiency. This standard relates to the quality of the
fiduciary’s performance of its services. In some circles, this
translates as well into not acting in a way that amounts to
negligence, by not materially harming the entrustor.
• Duty of loyalty: The fiduciary’s obligations relate directly to
entrusted power and property, and amount to avowing
conflicts of interest, as well as affirmatively promoting the
interests of the client.
There is some lively scholarly dispute over how these two sets of
duties play out in fiduciary relationships. Most scholars believe,
however, that the “duty of loyalty” is the single distinctive obligation
at the core of fiduciary relationships.88 Indeed, “[a]cross jurisdictions
and across theories, there is common ground on a basic conclusion:
loyalty is vital in fiduciary relationships.”89 Indeed, “[w]ithout
fiduciary loyalty, the relationships would arguably not be fiduciary at
all.”90 Other experts acknowledge the fundamental divergence, but
common fiduciary law foundations, between the two sets of duties.91
The substance of these two duties is also less than perfectly
settled. Nonetheless, the core components, rationale, and trendlines are
relatively well established in many jurisdictions.
Fiduciary Care
While duties of care abound in private law, particularly tort law,
many commentators highlight a distinctive version in fiduciary law
doctrine.92 In both versions, the party who exercises a sufficient degree
of care is relieved of liability. In tort law, for example, this translates
into the avoidance of injurious wrongs, or harm to the other party.93
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The more unique fiduciary component, however, creates an
additional objective standard, one of ordinary care, prudence, and
diligence by a party with particular knowledge or skills carrying out its
assigned duties.94 The rationale is that the fiduciary beneficiary is in a
position of vulnerability vis-à-vis the fiduciary. So while the nonfiduciary version of the duty is ordinary care (“harm avoidance”), the
fiduciary version adds in the exercise of diligence and skill in one’s
conduct (what has been termed “prudent conduct” or “proper
performance”).95 In some legal circles this also can be seen as a variant
on the standard of “gross negligence.”96 As a result, a fiduciary duty of
care can be breached by an entity’s mis-performance, even absent any
injury to the beneficiary.97
The content of the duty of care can be highly contextual. For
example, the obligation can be quite lax as applied in corporate law
(shielded in part by the business judgment rule), while highly stringent
in trust law (amounting to a relatively strict standard of prudence).98
The substantive difference in standards derives from the divergent
interests of the parties.99
Fiduciary Loyalty
Fiduciary loyalty clearly constitutes a higher standard than
fiduciary care. In comparing the two, Frankel makes clear that the duty
of care is “not as weighty and prohibitory.”100
One can consider this duty [of care] to be weaker than the duty
of loyalty. In contrast to the duty of loyalty, which is linked
to misappropriation of entrustment, a violation of the duty of
care is linked to lack of expertise, inattention, and
negligence.101
Like the fiduciary duty of care, the fiduciary duty of loyalty
contains its own core element. In this case, as Andrew Gold explains,
the “no-conflicts” rule has been deemed proscriptive (a “thou shall
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not”). This so-called “thin” version, based in part on the law of trusts,
is composed of two elements.
• Conflicts of interest (between the pursuit of self-interest, and
the fulfillment of a duty to act for the benefit of the
beneficiary). The “no profits” rule (fiduciary cannot gain from
a conflicted transaction) often is subsumed within this bucket.
• Conflicts of duty (between duty, and pursuit of others’
interests). This comes into play in particular when the
fiduciary is serving multiple beneficiaries.102
In most cases, the duty of loyalty goes beyond its proscriptive
foundation. Typically, it is combined with the related fiduciary duty of
care (prudent conduct), duty of good faith (faithfulness and devotion to
the beneficiary), and duty of disclosure (shares accurate information),
to create a prescriptive obligation to act in the best interests of the
beneficiary. Again, the rationale is to protect the vulnerable party from
opportunistic behavior.103 The content of the duty of loyalty “should
depend on the potential for opportunism,” or abuse of power; the
“duties become more intense as the fiduciary’s power grows.”104
This “best interests” (sometimes referred to as “thick”105) notion
is key to understanding the unique content of the loyalty obligation.106
This composite form of loyalty “can be defined as a state of mind and
a manner of behavior in which one person identifies with the other
person’s interests.”107 Smith explains further that “the duty of loyalty
requires the fiduciary to adjust her behavior on an ongoing basis to
avoid self-interested behavior that wrongs the beneficiary.”108 To
some, the duty amounts to advancing practical interests of
beneficiaries;109 to others, adopting “other-regarding preference
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functions.”110 In perhaps more quantifiable terms, the duty amounts to
“demonstrable partiality.”111
So, in brief, the standalone, “thin” fiduciary duty of loyalty can be
thought of as the “no conflicts” obligation. The more expansive,
composite or “thick” fiduciary duty of loyalty amounts to a “best
interests” obligation.
It is worth noting that the “fiduciaries governance theory” has
been developed and applied to a variety of situations where there is no
obvious designated individual or entity. While the loyalty standard
itself largely remains the same, the object of the duty is an abstract,
other-regarding purpose.112 In practice, this can include “statements of
common purpose” for a specific mission.113 The classic example is the
charitable purpose trust,114 but public benefits corporations, nonprofits, and even public corporations all can adopt such an objectoriented loyalty duty.115
By way of comparison, then, the general and fiduciary duties of
care, as well as the “thin” version of loyalty, present as objective,
“reasonable person” standards, and proscriptive (something to be
avoided) in nature. By contrast, the “thick” duty of loyalty is a more
subjective standard, prescriptive in nature (something to be done),
based on what is perceived to be in the beneficiary’s best interest.116
Put in medical terms, getting more exercise is prescriptive; avoiding
alcohol is proscriptive.
“Subsidiary” Fiduciary Obligations
Additional fiduciary obligations recognized by courts of equity
over many centuries include the duty of candor, duty of good faith, duty
not to delegate the services to others, and the duty of confidentiality.117
Typically they are subsumed as “subsidiary” or “implementing”
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obligations under either the duty of care or of loyalty.118 However, in
some legal quarters the duty of confidentiality has been deemed an
important supportive component of the “primary” fiduciary duties.119
As we shall see in the following sections, the duty of confidentiality
deserves special status in the digital environment as an “enabling”
obligation that strengthens the more well-established fiduciary duties
of care and of loyalty.
III.

EXAMINING THE INFORMATION FIDUCIARIES MODEL
A. The Common Law

The Zittrain/Balkin model for information fiduciaries rests on
combining in a specific way the “Why,” the “What,” the “Who,” and
the “How” elements of the common law.
First, the rationale for the IF is based on how “Big Data”
technology, at the heart of what Balkin calls the “Algorithmic Society,”
mediates relationships of power and control between people.120 Balkin
notes that the issue is not so much the technology, as the government
or company using the technology as a means of control over others.
The Algorithmic Age then is a struggle over the asymmetries of power,
information, and transparency, stemming from the collection,
transmission, use, and analysis of data. 121 Information fiduciaries are
necessary to help right this imbalance.
Second, the focus of the IF model is an end user’s data or
information. As Balkin paraphrases from a Silicon Valley saying, “Big
Data is the new oil.”122 The model is intended to reach across the
different types of data-based services provided by OSPs – namely,
ISPs, social media platforms, and search engines. The commonality is
access to personal information that has been obtained from end users.
Third, in the United States the information fiduciary obligation
would be induced in some fashion by Congress. While consistently
speaking of an “obligation” imposed on OSPs, Balkin’s paper
regarding IFs and the First Amendment also suggests that government
incentives such as tax breaks, safe harbors, or legal immunities could
be employed.123 More recently, Balkin and Zittrain have talked about
imposing the duty as part of a “grand bargain” between policymakers
118
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and large platform companies.124 However, the proposal’s aim appears
to be the adoption of a legal requirement, imposed on assumedly lessthan-willing entities. One can see this as a “status” approach, based on
its application to specific entities in specific roles of power over
personal data.
Fourth, in substance if not in nomenclature, the IF model
encompasses a general duty of care by OSPs. While Balkin explicitly
invokes the duty of loyalty in his more recent papers, his reasoning and
supporting examples do not in fact correspond to the common law
doctrine. This conclusion obviously deserves some unpacking.
1. Duties of loyalty and care
Balkin emphasizes that the IF model’s obligation is weaker in
some ways than the standard which is imposed on other information
fiduciaries, such as physicians and lawyers.125 Unlike doctors, OSPs do
not hold themselves out as taking care of end users in general, under
“comprehensive obligations of care.” 126 Nor should they be required to
“look out for the interests of clients and keep them from harming
themselves or doing foolish things.”127 And, an OSP should not have
“a positive obligation to stop asking people to reveal more of
themselves in social media.”128 This standard does not sound like a
“thick,” other-regarding version of the fiduciary duty of loyalty.
In fact, the IF model translates into allowing considerable leeway
to existing commercial models. OSPs, for example, should not be
required to back away from their current ads-based businesses.129
OSPs still would be allowed to use personal data, in ways that would
not involve betrayal and harm to users. Balkin even concedes that
collecting personal data in order to serve targeted ads “creates a
perpetual conflict of interest between end users and social media
companies;” rather than ban outright such a conflict, however, “the
goal should be to ameliorate or forestall the conflicts of interest.”130 A
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contrary tack of resolving such conflicts of interest decisively in favor
of the end user would be a hallmark of the “thin” duty of loyalty.131
Balkin does explain that “[t]he nature of their duties depends on
the kind of business they present to the public . . . [what] seems like a
breach of trust [] depend[s] on the kind of service that entities provide
and what we would reasonably consider unexpected or abusive for
them to do.”132 However, at some point the exceptions swallow up the
rule. That would appear to be the case here.
The proscriptive language that Balkin employs also demonstrates
a focus on avoiding harms to end user. The IF should not misuse
personal information,133 use sensitive information to the user’s
disadvantage,134 “attempt or threaten to embarrass you,”135 manipulate
you into voting a certain way,136 use data in unexpected ways to
disadvantage you,137 betray end users or work against their interests,138
or otherwise “create an unreasonable risk of harm to their end users.”139
At the outset the IF model is intended to “counteract the most egregious
examples of bad behavior.”140 The gravamen of all these scenarios
seems to be “harming end users.” Needless to say, avoiding harm is the
quintessential core of the general duty of care, and does not correspond
to either version of the loyalty obligation.
Does the IF model also include a fiduciary duty of care?
Apparently so. Balkin concludes, for example, that Facebook violated
the duty of care in the Cambridge Analytica scandal by not taking
sufficient care or adequate steps to vet partners, audit and oversee
operations, ensure third parties maintained care of the user data, or claw
it back.141 That language certainly mirrors the “prudent conduct” core
of the fiduciary duty of care.
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2. Duty of confidentiality
Balkin also invokes the duty of confidentiality as an obligation on
equal par with the duties of care and of loyalty. Under the traditional
common law treatment discussed above, this duty typically acts as one
of a number of secondary, “subsidiary” obligations to the primary
fiduciary duties. However, as Mike Godwin points out, given its unique
supportive role vis-a-vis other fiduciary obligations, confidentiality
merits special -- perhaps even co-equal -- status, vis-à-vis the
“primary” duties.142
Theorists have noted that although there is considerable overlap,
confidential relationships can be distinguished from fiduciary
relationships.143 Crucially, the concept of keeping confidences rests on
the same foundations of entrusted power, private knowledge, and
personal relationship that undergird in particular the fiduciary duty of
loyalty. Moreover, it is difficult to conceive of a bona fide fiduciary
relationship in the absence of a binding confidentiality requirement.
Guarding the secrecy of information provided as part of private
communications would seem to be a key component to relationships
built on both thin and thick forms of fiduciary loyalty.
In key respects, then, confidentiality is a precursor and enhancer
to forming a successful fiduciary relationship. As Godwin puts it
succinctly, “confidentiality is the real trust-builder.”144
For now, the salient question here is whether and how the IF
model incorporates a duty of confidentiality. Balkin’s repeated
rejection of any analogue to doctors and lawyers, which carry with
them explicit confidentiality requirements, casts some doubt. At the
same time, while the general and fiduciary duties of care can and likely
do exist in many cases without an express confidentiality mandate,
likely they would be the worse for it.
In his most recent work on the IF model, Balkin ties together an
obligation of care (do no harm) with keeping confidences:
The duties of care and confidentiality require fiduciaries to
secure customer data and not disclose it to anyone who does
not agree to assume similar fiduciary obligations. In other
words, fiduciary obligations must run with the data.145
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E-mail from Mike Godwin to author (August 22, 2019) (on file with author) (“Godwin to
Whitt Private Communication”).
143
See Smith, supra note 72, at 1465-67.
144
Godwin to Whitt Private Communication, supra note 142.
145
Fixing Social Media’s Grand Bargain, supra note 31, at 13.

2019]

OLD SCHOOL GOES ONLINE

99

Not disclosing a customer’s information to third parties would
seem a core attribute to a duty of confidentiality. In this case, ascribing
some benefit of the doubt supports acknowledging that the IF model is
intended to include an obligation of confidentiality.
Thus, the Zittrain/Balkin approach for information fiduciaries
aims at improving power and control asymmetries between Web
companies and their users. Some imprecise language aside (or perhaps
indicia of a still-evolving standard), the IF model would impose both
general and fiduciary duties of care, and a related duty of
confidentiality, on a range of online entities regarding their use of their
users’ personal information.
B. The Khan/Pozen Critique
Khan and Pozen’s basic argument is that the duty of loyalty is an
ill-fitting remedy to the Facebooks of the world. Much of the challenge,
the authors claim, is that anything beyond “do no harm” would clash
directly with the overriding corporate imperative to maximize financial
value from existing business models.146 To that extent, the Khan/Pozen
analysis casts significant doubt on Congress’ ability to mandate a
fiduciary duty of loyalty on U.S. corporations.
As we have seen, however, the IF model is based squarely on
duties of care, not of loyalty. Attributing a mandated fiduciary duty of
loyalty is an understandable misreading, given Balkin’s invocation of
that standard in his later papers.147 However, as highlighted above,
Balkin and Zittrain appear to want no part of an actual fiduciary loyalty
standard. So, the Khan/Pozen paper essentially is doing battle with an
empty suit.
Noting some of the internal inconsistencies in the actual duty
involved, the Khan/Pozen paper suggests one reading that would
“cabin any fiduciary duties afforded to users so that they do not
seriously threaten firm value,” or the structure of the Delaware
corporate fiduciary law.148 Otherwise:
For if the concept of digital information fiduciaries does not
require online platforms to place their users’ interests above
all other interests, it is unclear what work the concept is
supposed to be doing. More than that, it is unclear how this is
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Khan & Pozen, supra note 15 (manuscript at 21).
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a fiduciary approach in any meaningful sense.149
The cogent response to those questions is that the actual concept
behind the IF model is to protect users from various harms and
imprudent conduct, under general and fiduciary duties of care. Those
duties do have some weight, and likely would prohibit more conduct
than Federal law currently permits. If such mandates were imposed by
Congress, for example, a corporation expressly maximizing
shareholder value by deliberately harming its users would amount to a
plain violation of the general duty of care. Similarly, a corporation
performing its various responsibilities in an imprudent and
irresponsible manner would amount to a violation of the fiduciary duty
of care. It is difficult to imagine that Facebook shareholders, or officials
with the State of Delaware, would have reasonable grounds to take
serious issue with either obligation.150
Thus, the IF model should survive legal scrutiny – so long as it
sticks to the general and fiduciary duty of care obligations. Further, the
Khan/Pozen critique leaves open the probability that a true duty of
loyalty can coexist with the business imperatives of entities willingly
entering the market under such conditions.
C. Zuckerberg Claims the Fiduciary Mantle
As indicated earlier, Mark Zuckerberg has weighed in to suggest
general support for the Balkin/Zittrain proposal.151 Moreover, he
believes Facebook already is serving as a fiduciary to its end users.
Zuckerberg has stated that “our own self image of ourselves and
what we’re doing is that we’re acting as fiduciaries and trying to build
the best services for people.”152 And later, “[o]ur self image is largely
acting as – in this kind of fiduciary relationship . . . .”153 Apparently, as
he describes it, the equation amounts to people choosing to use
Facebook, and Facebook then building services it believes are best for
them.

149

Id. (emphasis in original).
Khan and Pozen argue as well that a social media company like Facebook does not possess
necessary attributes of loyalty, namely (1) access to a user’s most personal data, and (2) services
of expertise. Id. (manuscript at 18-20). These arguments seem inapt. To the extent the authors
are attempting to undermine application of the supposed duty of loyalty underpinning the IF
model, the attempt is unnecessary. Nor, frankly, is the argument all that convincing on its
merits. Facebook plainly has ready access to a trove of personal user data, and also possesses
singular expertise to utilize that data in myriad ways.
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It is unfortunate that the precise nature and scope of the supposed
fiduciary obligation – whether Facebook is exercising a duty of care or
a duty of loyalty – is not brought up in the interview. Nonetheless, if
Zuckerberg believes that Facebook already is acting as a fiduciary to
its end users, even at the lower fiduciary duty of care level, the evidence
suggests otherwise:
• Lack of notice: Facebook has never expressed before this
concept or defined its substance. As a result, its users have no
ability to even understand, let alone negotiate or contest, the
existence of an actual fiduciary relationship with the
company.
• Lack of legitimate consent: Facebook users have never given
their express approval to become clients in a fiduciary
relationship with the company.
• Lack of substance: Facebook’s recent marketplace actions do
not appear consistent with a fiduciary, even at the lowest level
duty of care.
• Lack of accountability: Facebook users have no direct
recourse for possible violations of their fiduciary obligations.
D. Choosing Our Words Well
While the sheer expanse and depth of common law areas like
fiduciary doctrine can be challenging, one upside is that its flexible
nature can accommodate developing societal concerns. Indeed, Frankel
points out that the common law is a relatively open-ended instrument
for “allowing the acceptance of new fiduciaries into the field.”154 As a
result, nearly any problem rooted in power relationships between
people can be deemed a fiduciary problem.155 That would extend, it
seems, to the dynamism of the World Wide Web in the early 21st
Century.
On the other hand, it is particularly crucial to have that public
conversation now, rooted in the actual rationale of the equity and
common law concepts of being a fiduciary. While the obligations in
practice remain fraught around the edges, the core fiduciary duties of
care and of loyalty should not be confused. As Zuckerberg’s recent
statements only highlight, employing our legal language and concepts
without sufficient precision can be problematic. Otherwise, there is a
credible threat that as the terms enter into more common parlance
among stakeholders, they will become misunderstood before having
the opportunity to shed much-needed light.
154
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Frankel, supra note 56, at 183.
Id. at 78.
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In short, then, we should avoid, in the words of one scholar, “a
sense of fiduciary so open as to be empty.”156 A nuanced understanding
of the nomenclature, purpose, and application of fiduciary law doctrine
can only better inform the larger public debate.
IV.

OPTING INTO A DEEPER LOYALTY: DIGITAL
TRUSTMEDIARIES

This Part proposes a new type of fiduciary, the digital
trustmediary (or “DTM”), with scope, participants, and obligations
intended to have particular relevance to the Web platforms era. Parts V
and VI then will propose joining together the IF and DTM models in a
common governance framework.
The conjoined meaning embedded in the name should help
explain its three key components.
• The term “digital” is meant to connote that the scope – the
“What” -- of its obligation runs broader and deeper than just
an end user’s personal data or information. Indeed, potentially
it would include all types of interactions in digital (meaning
modern-day) environments, including those normally thought
of as part of supportive human relationships.
• The term “trust” is meant to invoke the relational essence of
the fiduciary relationship – the “How” -- which is rooted in
both proscriptive and prescriptive loyalty. The trust involves
two particular kinds of fiduciary relationship – loyalty and
confidentiality -- and the human trait of trustworthiness that
the model seeks to embrace.
• Finally, the term “intermediary” refers to the voluntary
mediating role – the “Who” – that the entity plays, providing
an active virtual interface between the user (who is now a
client) and its digital experiences.
The remainder of this Part will explore these considerations in
more depth.
A. The “Why” – Challenging Unbalanced Platform Markets
The context for this proposal is important to understanding its
potential relevance.
My previous Hiding in the Open paper unpacked and examined
the openness paradigm, as applied to a variety of natural and human-
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made systems, networks, and platforms.157 There, I also described the
rise of networked emergent technology (NET) platforms. The paper
attributes the NET platforms’ incredible success to a combination of
three interrelated factors: Web inputs (user data and content), Net
effects (positive externalities, network effects, feedback loops,
economies
of
scale),
and
Platform
dynamics
(the
connectivity/communication function that bridges disparate sets of
users).158
From a functional standpoint, these platforms combine various
Internet overlays (Web portals, mobile applications, computational
systems) and underlays (networks, clouds, personal devices, sensing
devices). These elements are mixed with considerable amounts of data,
derived from users’ fixed and mobile online activities, and various
“offline” activities (collected via environmental mechanisms: the
Internet of Things, augmented reality, and robotics), as well as
information inferred by machine learning algorithms.159
Some of the largest multisided platforms have woven together all
these powerful elements into highly lucrative, multidimensional
ecosystems.160 They are premised on what Google’s Chief Economist,
Hal Varian, has called in straightforward fashion the practice of “data
extract[ing] and analy[zing].”161
The concern is that these multidimensional ecosystems in essence
are driving distinctly unbalanced platforms. The end user on one end
of the platform has become, in Varian’s telling, the object of data
extraction and analysis. The true subjects operate on the other ends of
the platform: the data brokers and analyzers, including purveyors of
advertising technologies (“adtech”) and marketing technologies
(“martech”).162 While the end users do receive benefits, often in the
form of “free” goods and services, they are paying through the
extraction and analysis of their personal information, and its
subsequent exposure to data brokers and others.
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Whitt, supra note 3, at 31-66.
Id. at 66-70.
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Id. at 69.
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The thesis here is that this asymmetric treatment of stakeholders
in the NET platforms ecosystem is not well serving the legitimate
interests of many of its end users.163 As put elsewhere:
One missing ingredient today appears to be basic human trust,
an assurance that online interactions are founded on consent,
accountability, and [transparency]. With new technologies of
data control now coming online--the Internet of Things, cloud
computing, A.I. and machine learning, augmented reality,
biometrics and more—that existing trust and accountability
deficit likely will get appreciably worse.164
Why then should the hoary common law of fiduciaries law be
relevant here? Because, if one believes the troubling narrative sketched
out above, the situation is ripe for a market intervention, based on
fostering trustworthy and accountable relationships. If we are to retain
an “open” Web, trust is vital. In turn, an “open” Web requires human
agency, institutional accountability, and overall relational support – all
of which are lacking in the current Web environment.165
More to the point, the core elements of a fiduciary relationship are
in play:
• First, there is entrusted power. Online platforms and other
OSPs have access to, and exercise discretionary power over,
the significant practical interests (personal data, sensitive
information, user-generated content, etc.) of the platform end
users.
• Second, the source of power in this instance is uniquely
opaque. Who is doing what with my data typically is hidden
from view or written ambiguously in privacy policies, with
Web services rendered by complex algorithmic systems,
under often-obscure terms of service.
• Third, there is considerable skill and expertise involved in
collecting, moving, storing, handling, analyzing, and
otherwise utilizing personal data and information.
• Fourth, there exists at least some modicum of trust, or
otherwise users would not utilize various platforms’ services.
Potential distrust often is overridden by the zero price services
provided, and/or a lack of knowledge about the tradeoffs.
• Finally, there is considerable risk of harm to users emanating
from the entrustment, and their considerable reliance on
OSPs.
163

Whitt, supra note 3, at 74-75.
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Should these elements not be found to constitute a bona fide
fiduciary relationship between an OSP and its end users, at minimum a
torts-like general duty of care (“do no harm”) can offer some
protections. Should some more limited form of relationship be
established, the fiduciary duty of care of prudent conduct could be
found to apply as well. Regardless, either one or both of those duties of
care could be mandated by law, in ways consistent with corporate law
and the U.S. Constitution.
What then about the “thick” and “thin” versions of the fiduciary
duty of loyalty? If compelled by law, such a duty may be
unconstitutional, as the Khan/Pozen analysis demonstrates (and, if
nothing else, the duty would be politically challenging to enact into law
in the first place). Plus, as Frankel observes, forced loyalty is not true
loyalty at all.
Another option suggested here is to create a new Web ecosystem,
based on entities voluntarily operating under the composite (thick)
fiduciary duty of loyalty. This would include both forms of care, and
both forms of loyalty, as well as an enabling duty of confidentiality.
An enlarged role for government in the OSPs world seems
inevitable. In the meantime, however – and ideally in concert – there is
a role for the rest of us as well, in creating a new Web ecosystem,
centered on more balanced digital platforms, governed by healthier
incentive structures.166 If the community is indeed the critical asset of
any multisided platform,167 the objective is to substantially improve the
experience of its stakeholders.
The digital trustmediary model, presented below, is one such
proposed approach. One which “could pose worthy market alternatives
to the more intrusive ‘Ads+Data World’ commercial model still
underpinning many online platforms.”168
B. Creating More True Fiduciary Relationships
The “Why” analysis, provided above, does not differ appreciably
from Balkin and other commentators. The DTM model does however
rest on different responses to the “What” and “Who” and “How”
queries.169
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The DTM model incorporates three core principles, with
important relevance derived from fiduciary law. First, the relationship
between client and agent is a broad one, taking on all aspects of modern
digital life. Second, the relationship would be entirely voluntary, opted
into willingly by both sides. Third, the relationship would entail a duty
of loyalty, owed by the DTM to the now-entrustor/client. So, the
relational element of the traditional fiduciary relationship is preserved,
along with the notion of addressing entrusted power. The DTM model
is intended to be a case of digital platforms done right.
1. What: A Digital Life Support System
In line with the “Why” of actively promoting the client’s interests,
the DTM model entails providing robust support to clients. This
support can take place at one or more different levels.
The vision is broader than merely protecting against data-related
harms. The model also encompasses an individual creating and
building a relationship with a digital trustmediary that actively
promotes that individual’s interests.170 One example is the extraction
and analysis of personal data, which today is accomplished more or
less surreptitiously. In a trusted and accountable relationship, raw data
about myself can become relevant information, and even more relevant
knowledge. With the assistance of a DTM, that knowledge then can be
shared with others as part of a mutual, consensual exchange of value.
There are several possible layers of functions, under attendant
fiduciary duties, that the DTM can perform for its clients. These can be
thought of as three separate tiers to protect, enhance, and promote, or
“PEP.” Optimally, through positive experiences at lower tiers, the
170

Doc Searls’ longstanding work in furtherance of Vendor Relationship Management (VRM),
including Customer Commons, is a guiding light in my conception of the DTM’s role in
fashioning its clients’ “digital life support systems.” See, e.g., SEARLS, https://www.searls.com
(last visited Oct. 1, 2019) (Searls’ main website); Neil Davey, Doc Searls: VRM and the new
tools of engagement, MYCUSTOMER (Jan. 25, 2010),
https://www.mycustomer.com/selling/crm/doc-searls-vrm-and-the-new-tools-of-engagement (an
early VRM posting); CUSTOMER COMMONS, https://www.customercommonsorg (last visited
Oct. 1, 2019) (Customer Commons main website). Yet another paradigm-shifting Searls
conception is the so-called fourth party, which is intended to represent the customer’s interests.
See Doc Searls, VPM and the Four Party System, PROJECT VRM (Apr. 12, 2019),
https://blogs.harvard.edu/vrm/2009/04/12/vrm-and-the-four-party-system/. A useful analogy is
the typical modern-day real estate transaction. The seller is deemed the first party, and the buyer
the second party. Both the listing agent and the showing agent are third parties supporting the
seller, even though they do not always appear that way to the unsuspecting buyer. Only in more
recent times has the “buyer’s agent” appeared on the scene. In Searls’ parlance, that agent is the
fourth party representing the buyer’s interests. Amidst the myriad of countless Web interactions
and transactions, the DTM would occupy that fourth party role, in perpetual virtual orbit around
its clients.
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client would opt to have the DTM take on further functions on her
behalf. A virtuous cycle of trust would serve both sides well.
Level One: Protect
At a basic Level One, the DTM can provide fundamental client
protection. This could range from taking on mundane but stillimportant online tasks for clients, such as managing passwords,
updating software, patching security holes, and establishing privacy
settings. The DTM also could shoulder more daunting cognitive
burdens to promote the client’s interests, such as analyzing and
providing guidance concerning the terms of service (ToS) of websites
and applications. On the duty side of the equation, this protection role
matches up well with a general duty of care.
Level Two: Enhance
At a more advanced Level Two, the DTM could act as a filtering
conduit, through which flows selectively all of the client’s interactions
with the World Wide Web. The function could include the full
protection and preservation of my data lifestream. This particular role
could include establishing a virtual zone of trust and accountability to
protect the individual from unwanted outside intrusions. In essence, the
DTM would help present my enhanced human self to the digital world.
This obligation is approximated by a “thin” duty of loyalty.
Level Three: Promote
Finally, at Level Three, the DTM could employ still more
advanced and emerging technology tools to fully protect, enhance, and
promote the client’s interests. This could include virtual avatars,
personal cloudlets, sovereign identity layers, portable connectivity,
modular devices, and preserved content.171 The “thick” duty of loyalty
seems most apt here.
One example of a Level Three-type function is the concept of an
individual digital agent, sometimes called a “Personal AI.” 172 A DTM
could arm its client with on-device computational software that could
interact directly with so-called “Institutional AIs,” such as Amazon’s
Alexa and Google’s Assistant. This Personal AI could perform a bevy
of functions, including effectively protecting the client from unwanted
digital surveillance, as well as promoting the client’s own intentions in
the online environment.173
171

See GLIANET, supra note 165.
Throughout this paper, “AI” is abbreviated for “Artificial Intelligence.”
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This author’s recent series of articles makes the case for Personal AIs. Richard Whitt,
Democratize AI (Part I), Medium (June 3, 2019), https://medium.com/swlh/democratize-ai-part172
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Who: Opting In

In this new dynamic, the Web user can enter into a legallybinding, arm’s-length agreement with a trusted entity. Upon becoming
part of this new commercial arrangement, this entity can be referred to
as a digital trustmediary. As a client, I would agree to compensate this
DTM in some manner for the services and technologies it provides to
me, my family, and/or my various communities of interest. And in
return, this entity pledges to fully represent my unique interests, to both
the online and offline worlds.
Because this model would be opted into voluntarily by both sides,
it mirrors a “consent” approach from the fiduciary law tradition. As
Frankel notes, “[f]iduciary services are best rendered voluntarily.”174
Compelling an unwilling party to undertake such a relationship, on the
other hand, can actually endanger the recipients and their interests.175
In the first instance, the user would select one or more entities to
become a digital trustmediary. Theoretically, at least, there would be a
plethora of viable candidates. For example, leading companies in the
tech space could capitalize on their existing trustworthiness with their
customers. But others could vie for that relationship as well, including
any entity with whom one has established trust. These options might
entail for example a favorite television or radio broadcaster, or news
organization, or retailer, or broadband provider. This may also include
a local bank, library, church, university, food co-op, coffee shop,
political party, or a governmental body. Or, an entity not yet born,
including so-called distributed autonomous organizations (DOAs)
based on blockchain platforms. The point is to begin with the core trust
relationship, rather than the technology.
3. How: Loyalty in Confidence to the Client
As part of voluntarily taking on the role of a trusted intermediary,
the DTM also would embrace the existence of a true fiduciary
relationship. This opt-in decision would recognize the obvious
fiduciary elements highlighted by Frankel and others,176 as well as
elevate the “ancillary” duty of confidentiality to a role of overall
enablement and enhancement.
i-ade3cc7f727d; Richard Whitt, Democratize AI: The Personal AI (Part II), Medium (June 18,
2019), https://towardsdatascience.com/democratize-ai-part-2-the-personal-ai-bedf819ace44;
Richard Whitt, Democratizing AI (Part 3): Action plans for creating Personal AIs, Medium
(July 1, 2019, https://medium.com/@whitt/democratizing-ai-part-3-efb8da5d956a.
174
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Id. at 4.
176
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In particular, under fiduciary duties of loyalty, the DTM and the
client would have an actual understanding, freely agreed to by both
sides. The client would receive all the tangible benefits of
accountability and trust that a mutually beneficial services arrangement
bestows. As a result, if the client is satisfied with the relationship, the
trust level rises, and she then can be more willing to further engage
with the DTM. In some cases, this could include an openness to share
more of her personal information lifestream. That openness, in turn,
creates more personal, social, and economic value, for both the client
(relevant Web connections) and the DTM (relevant services).
If it means anything, the supportive duty of confidentiality
requires keeping information away from prying eyes.177 Because the
DTM is rooted in a right relationship between client and agent, all the
key elements of that relationship have been established in confidence,
even before the individual has taken on that client status. What the
client shares, and what the agent comes to learn (which may not be the
same thing) would be subject to a confidentiality obligation. In real
terms, this furthers the interests of both parties; as the client reveals
more in confidence, the agent can better serve her interests. This feeds
back into the openness dynamic engendered by loyalty – and the trust
cycle reinforces.178
Of course, human beings make mistakes, and can act with selfish
intent. With the DTM, if the client is dissatisfied with something, she
would have some recourse. As in any ordinary business relationship,
there would be some form of accountability. Broken trust leaves the
client the ability to pursue various options – reputational, market,
and/or legal – to put things right. One scholar has suggested for
example that the FTC could exercise its Section 5 authority to find that
inducement of misplaced trust is a “'deceptive business practice.”179 As
will be discussed in Part VI infra, a professional accreditation or selfcertification regime is one governance avenue worth exploring for
implementing this model.
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This next section presents a provisional dive into whether and how
these different sets of fiduciary duties, as instantiated in the IF and
DTM models, can fit together in the online context. The intention is to
apply these duties to a number of tangible real-world examples, in a
way that provides useful guidance.
A. A Range of Duties
As we have seen from our discussion of fiduciary law in Part II,
the common law suggests four basic types of obligations that could be
applied to entities and their online activities. I would parse them out in
the following way:
• A general (tort-like) duty of care: “do no harm.”
• A fiduciary (negligence-like) duty of care: “prudent conduct.”
• A “thin,” proscriptive duty of loyalty: “no conflicts of
interests or duties.”
• A “thick,” prescriptive fiduciary duty of loyalty: “promote
best interests.”
These four sets of duties appear to constitute a continuum. They
range from the less to the more contextual, and from the purely
transactional of a minor traffic accident to the fully relational of a
committed relationship.
A fifth obligation, an enabling duty of confidentiality, also should
be recognized. In some ways, keeping confidences is the connective
tissue that binds together the other duties.180 At the same time, this
particular obligation is contextual, based on the underlying duty being
supported. In essence, the duty of confidentiality is like a ratchet, with
varying degrees of protection – “thinness” or “thickness” – dependent
on the nature and scope of the underlying fiduciary obligations.181
For example, when added to the general duty of care, the duty of
confidentiality is relatively limited – essentially, do not reveal things
about me that would harm me in a tort-like manner. When added to the
fiduciary duty of care, the obligation entails taking reasonable steps not
to reveal information disclosed in confidence. Both of these somewhat
narrow, “thin” interpretations make sense, as the duty of care tends to
be more transactional than relational.
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Only when supplementing the duty of loyalty does the duty of
confidentiality reach its full enabling power. The relational aspect of
the client-agent bond is made plain in the injunction that all such
confidences must be fully honored. This means not revealing the
substance or even existence of such confidences to outside third parties
not bound by the fiduciary relationship. One can view this incarnation
of the obligation as a “thicker” version, in parallel with the “thick” form
of fiduciary loyalty.
Given these parameters, the general duty of care should play out
well in nearly any online situation, including where there is no
preexisting contact or interactions between the parties. Even a limited
form of confidentiality should apply in such contexts. By contrast, the
three fiduciary duties should apply only where there is a preexisting
“entrusted” relationship of power, expertise, reliance, and risk.182
Thought of in another way, the duty of care creates an additional degree
of accountability in existing institutions, while the duty of loyalty
creates an additional degree of individual agency for new clients.
How then do these duties play out in OSP practices and behaviors
with regard to Web users? Largely it depends on the roles and functions
involved. Under a “form follows function” model the author has
employed elsewhere,183 a proposed test for fiduciary status would be
based on the form of the relationship between two parties, and the
specific functions to be provided.
1. Medical Health Duties
In functional terms, the physician-patient dynamic contains
crucial elements to form a fiduciary relationship. These include: (1) an
asymmetric power balance, based on the patient’s vulnerability; (2)
acquiring and utilizing sensitive health information about the patient;
(3) utilizing professional expertise to carry out specific tasks; and (4)
the patient’s reliance on such expertise. From these factors flows the
composite or “thick” fiduciary duty of loyalty, plus a “thick” form of
confidentiality, culminating in the fiduciary command to act in the
patient’s best interests.
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One complication is that modern day legislators have adopted the term “fiduciary duties” –
often referred to as “statutory duties” – which may or may not reach to actual equity-based
fiduciary obligation standards. Edelman, supra note 83, at 21, 23. The “prudent conduct”
fiduciary duty of care is one such category where legislation would presume or assign what is
called a fiduciary relationship.
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Whitt, supra note 3, at 74-78. See also Kiel Brennan-Marquez, Fourth Amendment
Fiduciaries, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 611, 652 (endorsing a “functionalist approach” to assigning
and delineating fiduciary duties).
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One useful way to think about differences between the duties is to
compare them with a parallel in the medical field: the Hippocratic Oath.
Basic principle of “first do no harm” (or, primum non nocere in Latin),
have been associated for centuries with Hippocrates the Greek
physician. Interestingly, the text passed down to us from ancient
Greece uses a different formulation: “to abstain from doing harm,” also
known as “nonmaleficence.”184 But the basic point is the same:
physicians should endeavor above all not to harm their patients. That
is a distinctly tort-like obligation, like the general duty of care.
As it turns out, however, remaining portions of the Hippocratic
Oath text provide detail about affirmative duties for physicians to
attend to the sick. In other words, doctors should actually and
deliberately help their patients. In a related medical text of that time
(Epidemics, Book One), physicians are told essentially to accomplish
two things: to do no harm, and to do good.185 The “golden axiom of
Chomel” similarly breaks down medical obligations into two sets of
rules. The “first law” is not to do harm, while the “second law” is to do
good.186
As a rough dichotomy, then, doing no harm correlates to the
general duty of care, while doing good essentially is the fiduciary duty
of loyalty. No harm could be considered a “negative” duty of restraint;
doing good is an “affirmative” duty of action. Keeping private the
confidentiality information revealed or gleaned about the client helps
bind the duties closer together.
2. “Digital Health” Duties
To the extent that such care/loyalty distinctions from the medical
world are illuminating, how would they be applied to the world of
online data practices? As we have seen in parsing Balkin’s IF model:
• The general duty of care amounts to protecting against harm.
In the digital environment, this would translate into: don’t
deliberately leave my personal data unsecured, don’t sell my
personal data to third parties you know likely will use it
against me.
• The higher fiduciary duty of care amounts to acting in a
prudent manner in protecting my personal data, and my online
184

Rancich AM & Gelpi RJ, Analysis of the ethical principles in medical oaths used by medical
schools of Argentina in relation to the Hippocratic Oath, MEDICINA BUENO AIRES, 1998,
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/9706247.
185
Hippocrates, Of the Epidemics, THE INTERNET CLASSICS ARCHIVE,
http://classics.mit.edu/Hippocrates/epidemics.1.i.html (last visited Oct. 1, 2019).
186
Auguste Francois Chomel, REVOLVY, https://www.revolvy.com/page/AugusteFran%C3%A7ois-Chomel (last visited Oct. 1, 2019).
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content. This would translate into: don’t be sloppy in securing
my data on your server, don’t leave your server farms
understaffed by poorly-trained employees.
• The enabling “thin,” proscriptive version of confidentiality
bolsters the care duties. This means, in essence: do not be
imprudent or unreasonable in allowing third parties to gain
unauthorized access to my private information, which they
would then use to my detriment.
The fiduciary duty of loyalty would demand more.
• The thin proscriptive version tells the fiduciary: do not have
any conflicts between your digital interests and my own, or
between different sets of clients. Do not sell my personal data
to the highest bidder. Do not program your AI to spy on me
and acquire my data.
• The thick prescriptive version sets the highest standard:
actually promote my interests. Do inform me about online
risks. Do keep my data in a super-safe location (i.e., not a
vulnerable server farm). Do filter out harmful or unwanted
content from my online feeds. Do arm me with technology
tools to protect my interests. Do present me with advertising
and marketing options tailored to my particular wants or
needs – or, no ads at all.187
• The enabling “thick,” prescriptive version of confidentiality
provides additional protections to the client. Do affirmatively
keep away from third parties all my information – from
personal data, to private confidences, to inferred wants and
needs – absent an explicit assent on my part.
So, in terms of interacting with user data, the duty of care would
cover protecting the user against harm arising from the fiduciary’s
conduct, including third parties seeking to gain unauthorized access to
the data. The duty of loyalty, by contrast, would cover protecting and
promoting the user’s interests, and her personal information, over the
fiduciary’s own interests.

187
Seen in this light, Google’s longstanding “don’t be evil” mantra (since removed from its
main website) sets a fairly low bar. If companies merely can avoid becoming the equivalent of
the Darth Vader of the Web, apparently that would be sufficient to meet the general (nonfiduciary) duty of care standard. In hindsight this fact should not be surprising, as Google (to
my knowledge) never has claimed to be in a fiduciary relationship with its users. As a corporate
slogan, “do be good” or “helping you do better” would approximate the higher standards of
conduct expected from a fiduciary relationship based on care and loyalty.
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B. Voluntary Loyalty Surpasses Grudging Care
The IF model’s “duty of care” promises to some degree to “lift all
boats” (all OSPs) to a minimal standard of non-harmful and prudent
conduct. The DTM model’s duty of loyalty standard by contrast (to
maintain the analogy) seeks to “rebuild the levees,” by raising up the
interests of one side of the existing online platforms: the end users.
When introduced into some real-world scenarios, each approach shows
its advantages, and its challenges.
1. Comparative Upside
The DTM model does provide some notable benefits.
First, per the Khan/Pozen paper, the conflict of duties between
users and stockholders they claim Facebook experiences would be
problematic under a mandated duty of loyalty regime. This conflict
derives from the fact that Facebook’s business model is already wellestablished. Assumedly the company’s stockholders support
Facebook’s ongoing market activities and data practices, which do not
(obviously) involve a fiduciary duty of loyalty to its users.
The same would not be the case, however, were an entity to take
on its fiduciary obligations for the first time, and willingly, with full
understanding and support from its stockholders. After all, the doctors,
lawyers, accountants, and others cited in the Khan/Pozen paper,
voluntarily joined their respective professions with already established
codes of conduct and ethics. So, the DTM model survives intact that
line of argument. Indeed, creating an “expectation of confidentiality”
should give would-be clients a greater degree of trust to pursue
fiduciary relationships with would-be DTMs.188
Second, the DTM model effectively sidesteps Balkin’s animating
concerns about potential First Amendment or Fourth Amendment
challenges from enlisting unwilling participants to become IFs.189
Once an entity of its own accord steps into the DTM role, the
constitutional issues should diminish.
While Balkin’s papers focus on the First Amendment implications
of the information fiduciaries model, the Fourth Amendment angle is
worth highlighting briefly. Under the “third party doctrine,”
individuals typically lack protected Fourth Amendment interests in
records that are possessed, owned, and controlled, by a third party.190
With the United States Supreme Court’s recent Carpenter v. United
188

Godwin to Whitt Private Communication, supra note 142.
Information Fiduciaries, supra note 16, at 1209-1220.
190
United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
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States decision, 191 the underpinnings of that doctrine have been called
into question.192
Balkin states that “we should have a reasonable expectation of
privacy for purposes of the Fourth Amendment” when we share
information with information fiduciaries.193 In his view, then, the third
party doctrine should not apply. However, because the IFs model is
premised on a combination of general and fiduciary duties of care, and
thin confidentiality, courts may be less likely to take IFs out of the
third-party doctrine category.
By introducing DTMs into the mix, however, the notion that
individuals have a reduced expectation of privacy in information
willingly shared with third parties is less likely to hold sway. In fact, if
a client agrees to share information with a DTM acting as a professional
fiduciary, bound by loyalty and confidentiality obligations, that client
should have a heightened, not a reduced, expectation of privacy.194
Future Fourth Amendment-related jurisprudence could well
acknowledge that special constitutional status for DTM-like entities.
Third, the DTM model provides an effective means of compliance
with new government-imposed data protection mandates, such as the
EU’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR).195 Because the
DTM need not actually own, control, or even possess its client’s data,
applicability of the data controller and data processor requirements
under the GDPR is questionable. Regardless, DTMs should be able to
meet, if not exceed, their GDPR obligations.
The GDPR is a notable achievement in furthering the cause of
increased protection of European citizens’ personal data. That said, one
can argue that the rules are a well-meaning but suboptimal fit for the
growing complexities of the online era. Two observations are worth
noting briefly here.

191

Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018).
Mike Godwin, What’s Next for the Reasonable Expectation of Privacy?, SLATE (June 27,
2018, 3:28 PM), https://slate.com/technology/2018/06/after-the-supreme-courts-carpenterruling-where-is-the-reasonable-expectation-of-privacy-heading.html.
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Information Fiduciaries, supra note 16, at 1231.
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See Kiel Brennan-Marquee, Fourth Amendment Fiduciaries, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 611, 65455 (2015). (When A shares information with B to obtain a socially valuable service, B should be
treated as an “information fiduciary,” so that B’s interactions with law enforcement are treated
as a Fourth Amendment search.). See also Mike Godwin, It’s Time to Reframe Our
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MEDIA AND DEMOCRACY WITHOUT BREAKING THEM 34 (Zenger Press, May 14, 2019)
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data).
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EU GDPR.ORG, https://eugdpr.org/ (last visited Oct. 1, 2019).
192

116

SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J.

[Vol. 36

First, the GDPR regime essentially accepts as given the current
Web ecosystem, and the “transactional paradigm” of reducing human
beings to conduits of static data points. Per the dominant theology of
Silicon Valley, information about people is perceived to be a resource
– much like oil – to be extracted and controlled and processed and,
ultimately, monetized. Whatever its merits, such a perspective seems
to crowd out other, more humanistic conceptions of personal data.196
Further, by relying on extensive transparency measures, repeated
consent notifications, and ex post compliance regimes, the GDPR puts
the onus on the end user constantly to represent her best interests.
“Consent fatigue” is bound to set in. Higher per-transaction costs and
cognitive overload will be a major, if not debilitating, challenge to the
GDPR construct.197 Many users in exasperation will simply resort to
clicking through a growing raft of “notice and consent” messages – and
in the process, potentially eroding actual real-world protections.198 As
one scholar puts it, “there are reasons to doubt the invincibility of
consent.”199
In contrast to that transaction-focused approach, the DTM model
is relational. This means that many consent-seeking, accountabilityestablishing, and trust-building elements would be presented up front
to potential clients, vis more human-friendly mechanisms. In essence,
the relationship can buttress otherwise shaky foundations of the
consensual.
Interestingly, several scholars have proposed that privacy be
viewed more aptly through the lens of human trust, including fiduciary

196
One such alternate perspective is the so-called “lifestream”, conceived by the Author as an
ever-evolving flow of individual and collective information rooted in human identity,
relationship, and experience. The pecuniary value of such flows is considered secondary to its
value as a way to unlock human potential. See GLIAnet, supra note 165.
197
This drawback is all the more problematic in the Internet of Things (IoT) environment, where
notice and the ability to register (lack of) consent seem all the more daunting.
198
See A critical reflection on #GDPR, TANTE (Apr. 3, 2018), https://tante.cc/2018/04/03/acritical-reflection-on-gdpr/. See also Larry Downes, GDPR and the End of the Internet’s Grand
Bargain, HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW (Apr. 9, 2018), https://hbr.org/2018/04/gdpr-and-theend-of-the-internets-grand-bargain.
199
NANCY S. KIM, CONSENTABILITY: CONSENT AND ITS LIMITS 2 (Apr. 4, 2019). See also
WALDMAN, supra note 9, at 83-85 (for many practical reasons, “notice-and-consent doesn’t
work.”).
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obligations. 200 “Put simply, privacy matters because it enables
trust.”201
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the DTM model
potentially disrupts and disperses incumbent economic power via
market activities. More traditional “behavioral” regulation can have the
unfortunate tendency to accept and lock in such power via regulatory
compliance regimes.202 Concerns over an incumbent’s “regulatory
lock-in advantage” have been raised as well regarding Europe’s
GDPR.203 That same premise seemingly could extend as well to other
regulatory regimes involving OSPs, and in particular large online
platform companies.204
2. Inevitable Tradeoffs
By the same token, the DTM model – with its broader scope,
heightened duties, and opt-in status – translates into new types and
greater degrees of responsibilities. These inevitable tradeoffs warrant
closer examination.
First, the DTM model encompasses not just personal data, but all
human interactions with the open Web and other ubiquitous digital
platforms, both online and increasingly offline. This expansive
purview obviously would require from the DTM more technical knowhow than would be the case in a purely data-focused regime.
Second, the DTM model rests on a base of positive incentives and
motivations, due to its reliance on voluntary, opt-in relationships
between willing parties. This approach is consistent with the

200
See HELEN NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT: TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, AND THE
INTEGRITY OF SOCIAL LIFE 199 (2009) (the lens of contextual integrity helps us conceive of
privacy within “spheres of trust,” and Web companies operating in information caretaker or
fiduciary roles). See also WALDMAN, supra note 9, at 85-88 (privacy-as-trust recognizes that
data collectors are being entrusted with user information, which should require fiduciary
obligations). See also Richards, supra note 6 (a new professional class of information fiduciaries
should be required as a means of protecting our intellectual data).
201
Richards & Hartzog, supra note 9, at 447.
202
Cory Doctorow, Regulating Big Tech makes them stronger, so they need competition
instead, THE ECONOMIST (June 6, 2019), https://www.economist.com/openfuture/2019/06/06/regulating-big-tech-makes-them-stronger-so-they-need-competition-instead;
Larry Downes, How More Regulation for U.S. Tech Could Backfire, HARVARD BUSINESS
REVIEW (Feb. 09, 2018), https://hbr.org/2018/02/how-more-regulation-for-u-s-tech-couldbackfire.
203
Doctorow, supra note 202.
204
This reputed incumbency advantage for the large platform companies also speaks to the
Khan/Pozen concern that a single-minded focus on fiduciary obligations will minimize or even
negate the desire to pursue competition law-based remedies. Khan & Pozen, supra note 15
(manuscript at 5, 27-29).
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observation that “forced loyalty may not be loyalty as such.”205
However, that very voluntariness also means that, absent obvious
incentives, entities are free to decide whether to become DTMs.
Third, the DTM model provides a duty of loyalty, which better
protects and promotes the interests of entrusting clients through newly
active agents with real “skin in the game.”206 Again, this heightened
standard would involve more responsibility and accountability for the
DTM.
So, given the considerably broader scope and substance of the
fiduciary obligations – with greater client support, technology knowhow, and legal compliance costs/risks – one challenge may be in
attracting sufficient number of entities willing to take on the mantle of
a digital trustmediary.
This concern is borne out by a 2004 thesis paper which explored
various reasons for the failure of the infomediaries model earlier in this
century.207 The author identified a number of new uncertainties for
businesses looking into become such infomediaries, including the need
to develop new online business models, pursue network-based lock-in
effects, determine the value in intangible information assets, better
understand their customers, and generate high levels of trust.208 Fifteen
years later, many of these same uncertainties appear to be relevant
considerations for building a healthy online ecosystem.209
Some of those concerns could be overcome, however, from
establishing attractive incentives for an entity to decide to opt into a
DTM model. By leveraging existing trustworthiness with its clients, for
example, the DTM can in theory gain (purely consensual) access to a
client’s most valuable personal data and information, doubly protected
205

Gold, supra note 89, at 393 (citation omitted). See also Frankel, The Rise of Fiduciary Law,
at 3 (“[f]iduciary services are best rendered voluntarily.”).
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DAILY LIFE (Feb. 27, 2018).
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Bethany L. Leickly, Intermediaries in Information Economies, YUMPU (Apr. 30, 2004),
https://www.yumpu.com/en/document/read/11549048/intermediaries-in-informationeconomies-communication-culture- (a Master of Arts in Communication, Culture and
Technology thesis, Georgetown University). A Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate
School of Arts and Sciences of Georgetown University in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of Master of Arts in Communication, Culture, and Technology.
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advantage of information as a commodity. Id. at 61.
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network-based information intermediaries, as “trustworthy information processing third
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by an enabling duty of confidentiality. The DTM model frees up
opportunities to utilize new business models, such as quality
advertising/marketing/branding arrangements, client intent-casting,
monthly subscriptions, per-transaction fees, and tokenized data access.
Other advantages could accrue. Incumbents with existing
customers or subscribers can use the DTM model to create more
“stickiness” in those relationships. Technology-savvy entities can
leverage the cutting-edge tech tools, like Personal AIs, as a way to
attract early adopters and others. More social-minded entities can
perceive the DTM loyalty obligations as another way to serve the
higher goals of the organization. As a result, a raft of governance
models (b-corps, platform cooperatives, blockchain foundations, etc.)
can be explored. And, if nothing else, the fear of being left behind in
the digital economy may propel some entities to consider the DTM
model as a way of gaining new market relevance.210
The other major concern is that, on the end user side of the DTM
platform, there would be an insufficient number of willing clients. The
Leickly study observes that consumers too face new uncertainties in
the growing e-commerce space, including information overload
(difficulty in differentiating between trustworthy and opportunistic
businesses), information asymmetry (inability to process relevant
information), technology weariness (prevalence of malfunctions,
failures, and hacks), and the moral hazard of reduced privacy online.211
Again, these concerns seem near-universal in the modern online world.
In particular, the opacity of the existing information asymmetries and
platform imbalances may not be readily discernible to the average Web
user. Surmounting these uncertainties will be crucial in order for an
actual DTMs-based ecosystem to take hold and succeed.
At bottom, then, the two visions have countervailing challenges.
A world of IFs may include too many of the unwilling, while a world
of DTMs may contain too few of the willing. This tension need not be
resolved decisively in one direction or the other. Instead, as we will see
in Part VI, the two models can be accommodated to the benefit of the
participants in both regimes.

210
As explained above, in the age of GDPR, and future international, national, and/or state data
protection and privacy regimes, one should not overlook the legal and regulatory compliance
advantages that would accompany adoption of the DTM model.
211
Leickly, supra note 206, at 49-50.
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C. A Cautionary Note: Zuckerberg and the Spectre of
Competition
In his February 2019 interview at Harvard, Mark Zuckerberg
draws a fascinating, if overlooked, contrast between people who would
be greatly empowered by the ability to choose their Web-based
intermediary, and the role of large platform companies:
If you have a fully distributed system, it dramatically
empowers individuals on the one hand, but it really raises the
stakes and it gets to your questions around, well, what are the
boundaries on consent and how people can really actually
effectively know that they’re giving consent to an institution?
In some ways it’s a lot easier to regulate and hold accountable
large companies like Facebook or Google, because they’re
more visible, they’re more transparent than the long tail of
services that people would choose to then go interact with
directly.212
Zuckerberg seems to believe that an assertion of serving his users’
interests should trump market interventions to give people additional
options. In fact, he all but invites government regulation. Per the
incumbent lock-in concerns mentioned previously, that policy
prescription might well end up maintaining Facebook’s current market
position with users. An alternative is to open up the market to “the long
tail” of entities that people willingly and expressly want to select to
“dramatically empower” them. The DTM model is one approach to
bridge the accountability gap that Zuckerberg raises as an obstacle to
achieving that promising scenario.
One option consistent with the Khan/Pozen critique is to
affirmatively prohibit OSPs – or at least those exhibiting non-fiduciary
practices – from taking on an affirmative duty to loyalty under their
current business models and corporate obligations. Their paper
demonstrates that the tension between the fiduciary duty of loyalty, and
the online platforms’ existing financial incentives and corporate
priorities, may be too deep to resolve without fundamental reforms.213
The exact duties of a fiduciary relationship between two parties
depends first on the actual function to be provided. This “form follows
function” approach would be violated by an entity, such as Facebook,
that assumes the mantle of trust, without providing the necessary
loyalty regarding their entrusted power over purported entrustors.

212
213
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Unless and until that functional “failure” were to be corrected, the duty
of loyalty should not apply.
VI.

A WAY FORWARD: THE “WHICH/WHERE/WHEN” OF
IMPLEMENTATION
A. Two Complementary Tiers

Adopting a multi-tiered approach containing both the IF and DTM
models has some support in fiduciary law doctrine. As Richard Brooks
puts it, “a fully developed model of the concept of an information
fiduciary would incorporate both the affirmative and negative duties
suggested by Laudon and Richards.”214
The structural pluralism school also provides some useful
guidance. Ideally, law should protect our core interests, while at the
same time, allowing latitude for people to engage in autonomous
behaviors. To Dagan and Hannes:
People should be able to choose from these institutions in line
with their own conceptions of the good and the means
necessary for its realization given their particular needs and
circumstances. . . . This fundamental commitment to selfauthorship . . . accommodate[s] heterogeneity. . . . [T]o the
extent possible, private law should attempt to overcome
problems of information asymmetry and cognitive biases by
prescribing sticky defaults rather than by curtailing choice
through mandatory rules.215
This observation suggests that a two-tiered fiduciary approach is
a doable way to protect the downside user risks, while enabling the
upside mutual benefits. In fact, each duty can in important ways
reinforce the other; for example, by building online human agency on
top of institutional accountability. While an imposed duty of care
facilitates higher degrees of accountability by existing OSPs, a
voluntary duty of loyalty supplies individuals with new agency as
empowered clients. As we also have seen, in the common law, the
fiduciary duties of care and loyalty interact with and bolster one
another by promoting best interests through their composite bundle of
“thick” duties. After all, sheer “loyalty” in the absence of any sense of
“care” does not necessarily guarantee the moral quality of the actions
that are informed by it.216 Nor does loyalty have much meaning where
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private information and confidences routinely are revealed to
unaffiliated third parties.
So, a mandated duty of care plus “thin” duty of confidentiality
could apply to those OSPs involved generally in personal user data,
while a voluntary duty of loyalty plus “thick” duty of confidentiality
could be adopted for those entities opting into direct, accountable
relationships with clients. Among other advantages, combining the IF
and DTM models in two separate tiers would provide the basis for
parties to explore and adopt a graduated set of obligations.
Getzler observes that fiduciary law can serve as a protective,
relatively stringent “penalty default rule,” with parties able to negotiate
downward from there.217 The suggestion here, however, would go the
other way: to adopt the “default rule” of a duty of care, and then allow
parties to negotiate upward to a higher duty of loyalty while supporting
confidentiality. This would accommodate, among other things, the
legal and political challenges of gaining adoption of a loyalty standard,
per the Khan/Pozen analysis.
B. Implementing the IF Model
In the United States, Federal legislation appears to be a leading
implementation option for the IF model. A notable example came about
in December 2018, when U.S. Senator Brian Schatz, along with
fourteen co-sponsors, introduced Senate Bill 3744, the “Data Care Act
of 2018.”218 Section 3 of the bill lays out the specific duties of OSPs
with regard to personal data. Three sets of obligations are enunciated.
• Duty of care: The OSP must reasonably secure data from
unauthorized access and provide prompt notice of data
breach.
• Duty of loyalty: The OSP may not use data in any way that
would benefit the OSP to the detriment of the user, would
result in reasonably foreseeable and material physical or
financial harm; or would be unexpected and highly offensive
to the user.
• Duty of confidentiality: The OSP may not disclose or sell
individual identifying data except as consistent with the duties
of care and loyalty.
S.3744 specifies that the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) is the
relevant regulatory agency to oversee its implementation. The FTC
may exempt certain categories of providers, services, and data,
217
218
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including conducting a cost/benefit analysis. State attorney general
(AGs) also could become involved, via civil actions against OSPs.
The proposed Data Care Act seeks to grapple head-on with
applying various fiduciary-based duties to OSPs. To that end, it is a
laudable contribution to the conversation, and potentially a useful
vehicle to bring to life the IF model. In one respect, however, the
legislation should be modified to avoid conflating the OSPs’ duty
standards.
As indicated above, the bill’s duty of care provision essentially
mirrors the general (tort-like) and fiduciary duties of care. Reflecting
the way that Balkin has articulated the IF model, however, the bill then
appropriates the duty of loyalty mantle for what amounts to an
additional set of duty of care obligations. For example, the duty of
loyalty provision mistakenly encompasses carrying out existing
services while merely avoiding harm. Further, the bill’s duty of
confidentiality lacks explicit content, instead tying a non-disclosure
requirement to carrying out the other two duties. To maintain a
doctrinally consistent approach, the bill text should clarify that its
requirements amount to the more limited reach of “do no harm” and
“prudent conduct” duty of care obligations, and a “thin” version of
confidentiality, and does not entail as well a fiduciary duty of loyalty.219
That said, the proposed Data Care Act is a good start in the United
States. That or similar Federal legislation could become the vehicle for
adopting general and fiduciary duties of care, applicable to the broad
range of OSPs and their data-related activities. As discussed above,
such legislation could include functional openness provisions as well,
which would help pave the way for a robust alternative market of
digital trustmediaries.
As it turns out, such bi-partisan legislation was just introduced.
Senate Bill 26581, the ACCESS (“Augmenting Compatibility and
Competition by Enabling Service Switching”) Act, was introduced on
October 22, 2019 by U.S. Senators Mark Warner (D-VA), Josh Hawley
(R-MO), and Richard Blumenthal. (D-CT).220 The bill combines
several functional openness provisions, with recognition of “custodial”
third parties operating on behalf of users under specified care-like
duties. The bill’s sponsors recognize that empowering digital
intermediaries with “portability, interoperability, and delegatability. . .
219
As observed above, mandating by law a relational fiduciary duty of loyalty would be
impractical, likely running afoul of constitutional, political, and commercial pushbacks.
220
Press Release, Mark R. Warner, Senators Introduce Bipartisan Bill to Encourage Competition
on Social Media (Oct. 22, 2019),
https://www.warner.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2019/10/senators-introduce-bipartisan-bill-toencourage-competition-in-social-media.
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will help put consumers in the driver’s seat when it comes to how and
where they use social media.”221
Specifically, the ACCESS Act would requires large platform
companies to operate interfaces allowing users to access and port their
data, as well as interfaces facilitating interoperability with third
parties.222 The legislation further allows users to delegate management
of their online interactions to “custodial third party agents.”223 Those
agents in turn would abide by specified duties, including reasonably
safeguarding user data, and not accessing such data in ways that would
harm the user.224
C. Implementing the DTM Model
1. Accountability: Codes and Certifications
A noteworthy advantage of the DTM model is that it need not be
adopted via prescriptive legislation, managed through challenging
political processes.225 Instead, interested entities and individuals can
begin now to establish DTM relationships, as anchors to a more
trustworthy and accountable Web ecosystem.
These DTM relationships can be bolstered by a number of
overarching institutional accountability measures.226 Among other
benefits, the existence of such accountability and compliance
mechanisms can help reduce entrustors’ risks.227 For example, entities
on their own can adopt and implement best practices, codes of practice
or conduct, or self-certification regimes. Similarly, groups of such
entities could coordinate via industry associations, certification bodies,
and/or multi-lateral stakeholder coalitions.
2. Accountability: Professional Status
Another interesting path to consider is creating an entirely new
profession for digital agents. Much like a physician or an attorney, the
221
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Adaptive Policymaking); Whitt, supra note 3, at 74-78.
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Frankel, supra note 56, at 31.
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digital fiduciary agent would hold itself out as the member of a
professional guild of experts. As one example, Jerry Kang and others
have suggested that “personal data guardians” play an intermediary
role in the information ecosystem, complete with “a professional
identity of expertise and service.”228 The core of this new profession
would be to act as a client’s trustworthy confidante, zealous advocate,
and wise counsellor.229 In other words, this profession could be
founded on a digital trustmediary’s thick fiduciary duty of loyalty and
enabling confidentiality obligation.
Treating the DTM as its own profession, complete with
enforceable codes of conduct, also can qualify for special treatment
under the U.S. Constitution. Godwin has argued that a statutory and/or
professional framework of fiduciary obligations should offer a DTMlike entity a similar special legal status as a doctor or a physician. In
turn, that entity should have legal standing to defend its clients’ Fourth
Amendment rights against government seizures of personal
information, and its clients’ First Amendment rights of speech and
privacy.230 To the extent this analysis proves correct, a professional
DTM becomes all the more attractive to would-be clients.
Balkin has argued that OSPs should not abide by higher fiduciary
obligations because consumers do not expect from them such doctorlike duties. While that may well be true in this particular moment (and
it is unclear that user expectations should be a deciding factor
regardless), that need not be the case going forward. Social norms and
values and expectations change and continue to evolve over time.
Establishing a new digital agency profession, complete with a full
panoply of fiduciary duties, can materially elevate those societal
perspectives.
3. Inducements: Public Policy Elements
One also can imagine parallel implementation efforts across a
myriad of public policy and market systems. For example, the IF duty
of care/thin confidentiality model can become the ground floor
obligation for certain Web-based entities, perhaps pursued as part of
Federal data protection and privacy legislation in Congress. At the
same time, the DTM duty of loyalty/thick confidentiality model can
become a key inducement presented to entities vying for actual clients.
228

Jerry Kang, Katie Shilton, Deborah Estrin, Jeff Burke, & Mark Hansen, Self-Surveillance
Privacy, 97 IOWA L. REV. 809, 828 (2012).
229
Id. at 828-29. See also Godwin, supra note 194, at 34-35 (suggests forming professional
associations of personal information trustees).
230
Id.
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Nonetheless, some OSPs, and large platform companies in
particular, may well resist having DTMs enter the Web marketplace.
Such resistance could extend to refusing to engage in meaningful
commercial transactions or provide functional access to necessary
platform inputs. In those instances, some policy assistance may be
required. This could include a mix of tailored market inputs and
incentives.
Previously the author has described how “functional openness,”
born out of regulatory policies developed at the FCC, has facilitated
new communications and information services markets by “opening
up” underlying platform resources.231 Via nondiscriminatory softwarebased interfaces, such regulated business inputs (RBIs) can include
new rights to interconnection, interoperability, and data portability,
under fair, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory (FRAND) conditions.232
The ACCESS Act legislation discussed above incorporates several of
these functional openness measures, albeit as part of a voluntary duty
of care-type regime. Other functional, structural, behavioral,
procedural, and informational safeguards, to protect both consumers
and competition, may be useful as well.233
VII.

LOOKING AHEAD: DIGITAL COMMON LAW?

Of course, the information fiduciaries debate is not occurring in a
vacuum. Even as we examine the prospects of applying specified duties
of care and of loyalty to certain OSP practices, there are larger
conversations yet to be had. This academic-seeming discussion should
not overlook the percolating market and technology activities that
already are reshaping portions of the digital landscape. Nor should we
neglect possible ways of stringing together disparate legal elements
into a coherent whole – namely, a digital common law.
A. A Bigger Canvas
Many emerging forms of human/technology mediation call for
greater coherence in our legal and policy thinking. For example,
potential governance models include the “data trust,” a group of
collective stewards of shared data, under a legal trust arrangement,
forming an ecosystem with differing business models and terms.234
231

Whitt, supra note 3, at 75.
Whitt, supra note 3, at 73-76. See also U.S. Senator Mark Warner, Potential Policy
Proposals for Regulation of Social Media and Technology Firms (July 30, 2018), discussed at
Whitt, supra note 3, at 72-73.
233
Whitt, supra note 3, at 76.
234
PINSENT MASONS, QUEEN MARY UNIVERSITY, & BPE SOLICITORS, DATA TRUSTS: LEGAL
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Related models include the “civic trust,”235 as well as the “civic data
trust” being championed by Alphabet’s Sidewalk Labs.236 Others have
been investigating as well the concept of a “data co-op.”237
In terms of novel data-centric business models, examples include
the “PIMs” (personal information managers) in the United Kingdom,238
and Jaron Lanier’s “MIDs” (mediators of individual data).239 Another
approach is utilizing so-called “reverse meters,” where businesses
compensate users with data/attention credits.240
Privacy-enhancing technology implementations also abound.
These include Sir Tim Berners-Lee’s SOLID PODs (personal online
data stores),241 Holochain’s distributed computing platform,242
digi.me’s personal data manager,243 and countless others. Ongoing
businesses should not be ignored, such as DuckDuckGo (search
engines),244 Firefox and Brave (Web browsers),245 Signal (text app),246
Mycroft (personal voice AI agent),247 and more.
The heterogeneity of these approaches is staggering. And yet, the
commonality is that all these disparate businesses and technologies are
crafting novel forms of privacy and autonomy-enhancing mediation
practices between end users and the Web. Can we consider the utility
of organizing, and even coordinating, all this burgeoning activity,
(Apr. 2019) (explores real-world application of data trust
concept); Jack Hardinges, What is a data trust?, ODI (July 10, 2018),
https://theodi.org/article/what-is-a-data-trust/ (Open Data Institute touts digital trust model);
Delacroix & Lawrence, supra note 131, at 9-10 (same).
235
Sean McDonald & Keith Porcaro, The Civic Trust, MEDIUM (Aug. 4, 2015),
https://medium.com/@McDapper/the-civic-trust-e674f9aeab43.
236
Sean McDonald, Toronto, Civic Data, and Trust, MEDIUM (Oct. 17, 2018),
https://medium.com/@McDapper/toronto-civic-data-and-trust-ee7ab928fb68.
237
Katrina Ligett & Kobbi Nissim, Ground Rules and Goals for Data Co-ops (May 24, 2019)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with the author).
238
Allen Loayza, Personal information management systems: A new era for individual privacy?,
IAPP (Mar. 21, 2019), https://iapp.org/news/a/personal-information-management-systems-anew-era-for-individual-privacy/.
239
Jaron Lanier &E. Glen Weyl, A Blueprint for a Better Digital Society, HARVARD BUSINESS
REVIEW, Sept. 26, 2018.
240
Richard Reisman, Reverse the Biz Model! – Undo the Faustian Bargain for Ads and Data,
MEDIUM (Dec. 3, 2018). See also Richard Reisman and Marco Bertini, A novel architecture to
monetize digital offerings, JOURNAL OF REVENUE AND PRICE MANAGEMENT, Feb. 28, 2018
(describes Fairpay reverse meter technology).
241
SOLID, https://solid.inrupt.com/ (last visited Oct. 3, 2019).
242
HOLOCHAIN, https://holochain.org/ (last visited Oct. 3, 2019).
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DIGI.ME, https://digi.me/ (last visited Oct. 3, 2019).
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DUCKDUCKGO, https://duckduckgo.com / (last visited Oct. 3, 2019).
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MOZILLA, https://www.mozilla.org/en-US/firefox/ (last visited Oct 3, 2019); BRAVE,
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under a single legal roof? In short, can we develop what amounts to a
digital common law?
B. A Bigger Framing
A parting thought is to explore, in the United States and
elsewhere, the potential for a grand synthesis of public policy, legal,
and regulatory elements. 248 Beginning with the fiduciary duties of care
and of loyalty, one suggestion is to come up with what would amount
to a digital common law. This would be a way of defining and applying
more nuanced, effective versions of traditional common law principles,
for all forms of digital activities.249
Already one can perceive viable use cases. As one example, a
shortcoming shared by both the IF and DTM models is that the
fiduciary protections extend only to those entities’ “first party” users
or clients. It is unclear how best to protect clients from unwanted “third
parties,” such as data brokers, who somehow have gained nonconsensual access to personal information.250 To help remedy that
scenario, one author suggests extending the IF model to cover the sale
and storage of data.251 Balkin himself proposes another approach,
which is adopting a new concept he calls “algorithmic nuisance,”
borrowed from tort law.252
Other uses of tort law are possible. William Prosser first
established the “privacy torts” of disclosure, false light, appropriation,
and intrusion – a category recently expanded on by Richards as
“information torts.”253
An additional possibility is to use the general theory of
misappropriation to cover the exploitation of personal data in one’s
possession (akin to a “data insider trading” prohibition). The larger
248
None of the following suggestions is intended to supplant or minimize the need for more
structurally-based remedies for market concentration concerns – namely, a nation’s competition
and antitrust laws.
249
This article’s focus has been on scenarios involving the treatment of an individual’s personal
data and information. Fiduciary obligations could be considered as well for the players involved
in producing and posting user-generated content (UGC) to online platforms, as well as those
who subsequently interact with such content. The context would differ, of course, but the
desirability of being able to treat certain individuals and collectives of users as agents in a
fiduciary relationship would be similar.
250
Delacroix & Lawrence, supra note 131, at 13.
251
Theodore Rostow, What Happens When an Acquaintance Buys Your Data: A New Privacy
Harm in the Age of Data Brokers, 34 YALE J. ON REG. 667, 699-700 (2017).
252
Three Laws of Robotics, supra note 31, at 1232-1241.
253
RICHARDS, INTELLECTUAL PRIVACY, at 156-157. Those information torts are publicity,
trespass, confidences, defamation, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Id. at 157159.
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point is that the depth and richness of the traditional common law could
be useful in filling in various gaps in existing laws and regulations.
An intriguing path was suggested in the Supreme Court’s recent
Carpenter decision.254 There, in a dissenting opinion, Justice Gorsuch
recommends exploring the use of the “positive” or common law of
bailments – where third parties temporarily hold personal property on
one’s behalf – as an alternative basis for Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence. In particular, he notes how bailment law could be
modified to suit the digital age, a perspective this author previously has
articulated for broadband access platforms.255 As Justice Gorsuch puts
it, “[j]ust because you entrust your data – in some cases, your modernday papers and effects – to a third party may not mean you lose all
Fourth Amendment interest in its contents.”256 He suggests that even in
the absence of a formal agreement between the data owner and its
possessor, the possessor may be a “constructive bailee” under an
involuntary bailment.257
A blend of common law doctrines could be useful to consider
here. As bailment has its common law roots in the protection of private
property, perhaps it could be appropriated for an individual’s
information instantiated as digital bits “at flight or at rest” – namely, in
data streams that course through telecommunications networks and
reside on cloud servers. By contrast, fiduciary law runs with the person,
and her confidences, and so could provide a useful analogue for
information/knowledge provided in more relational contexts.
Regardless, Justice Gorsuch’s reach for constitutional guidance from
the common law is a novel, and potentially constructive, way to map
some old school rules to scenarios involving emerging digital
technologies.
A clear advantage in devising a digital common law is that the
groundwork has existed, in some cases, for many hundreds of years.
Likely piece parts already have been proposed, or simply are waiting
to be rediscovered. Without offering here a critique, a few such options
could include:
• General duty of care, based on negligence standards;258
254

See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2206-2223.
Richard Whitt, Evolving Broadband Policy: Taking Adaptive Stances to Foster Optimal
Internet Platforms, 17 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 417, 494-495, 504-505 (2009) (hereinafter
Evolving Broadband Policy).
256
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2269 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
257
Id. at 2270.
258
Wheeler, supra note 13, at 10-12. Wheeler’s article states that it is based on the IF model,
which in turn is premised on the fiduciary duty of care. Id. at 12 n.1. The text of Wheeler’s
article reveals however a tort-like general standard of care.
255
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•

Statutory duty of care for websites posting “user-generated
content;”259
• “Duty to deal”260 (applicable to platform company
“bottlenecks”);
• “Functional openness” requirements (wholesale market
inputs); and
• Bailment obligation (data carriage and storage).261
In the United States, these and other learnings could be adopted
and applied by existing agencies, such as the FTC, the FCC, and the
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). While each
agency has its own charter and processes for addressing the technology
issues within its purview, reliance on elements of common law doctrine
should not be too great a conceptual or procedural stretch. As Justice
Gorsuch’s analysis also shows, judicial bodies too can look to
traditional common law as a prism for resolving complex digital issues.
CONCLUSION: DIGITAL LOYALTY THROUGH THICK AND THIN
The debate over information fiduciaries highlights an important
truth: the future needs the past. Common law does indeed have useful
things to contribute to modern day concerns about the role of digital
technologies in our society. As Brooks puts it, the application of
fiduciary principles “will continue to grow and acquire salience,” as
policymakers and others “borrow doctrine from fiduciary law to
regulate the possession and sharing of knowledge in our increasingly
information-dense world.”262 The Balkin/Zittrain “information
fiduciaries” proposal is a worthy contribution to the challenges of
dealing with the entrusted relational power of various data-based online
entities.
At its best, “[f]iduciary law is attuned to human nature.”263 An
important societal conversation now is underway over whether and
how online service providers and multisided online platforms should
abide by fiduciary obligations as they provide their services to us. The
jury of public opinion remains out on those questions.
259

See, e.g., HM GOVERNMENT, ONLINE HARMS WHITE PAPER 62 (Apr. 2019),
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/fil
e/793360/Online_Harms_White_Paper.pdf (consultation closed); Lorna Woods & William
Perrin, Internet Harms Reduction: a Proposal, CARNEGIE UK TRUST (Jan. 30, 2019),
https://www.carnegieuktrust.org.uk/blog/internet-harm-reduction-a-proposal/ (applying
statutory duty of care to user content hosted by third party platforms).
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Brooks, supra note 78, at 241.
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The perspective here is to embrace some lessons from human
experience, and clear away growing doctrinal confusion, without
necessarily adopting a slovenly obeisance to the past. Hopefully
interested stakeholders – from businesspeople to technologists to
policymakers – can incorporate useful takeaways into their future
plans, while the rest of us can begin elevating our collective
expectations of what it means to be a digital participant in the 21st
Century.
We need not wait however to begin making real progress to
protect and promote the interests of Web users. Those users deserve
options that embrace standards of care, loyalty, and confidentiality,
which treat them like actual clients. The digital trustmediaries model
in particular can usher in a more balanced and healthy platforms
dynamic, bringing together willing participants bound by mutual
benefit and – yes – trust.

